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Public enforcement actions frequently result in the distribution of money to people affected by 
violation of market protection laws. This “public compensation” returns billions of dollars to 
consumers, investors, and others each year. The law of public compensation appears confusing 
at first impression because of inconsistent use of nomenclature and conceptual confusion, but 
courts have developed a discernible set of principles that allow for presumptions and loosened 
proof standards in awarding this relief. This doctrine held for decades despite repeated 
challenges by business defendants. The Supreme Court’s decision in Liu v. SEC in June 2020, 
followed by its grant of certiorari in July 2020 to review enforcement actions brought by the 
Federal Trade Commission, have unsettled the law. 
 
This paper offers two contributions to the development of the law of public compensation. First, 
we analyze decades of judicial decisions across federal and state public enforcement agencies 
and identify consensus legal principles for awarding two different forms of public 
compensation—disgorgement and public restitution. We extend the less developed doctrine of 
public restitution by suggesting a proportionality test to provide guidance for more difficult 
cases. Second, we propose legislation to create uniform statutory authority for public enforcers 
that would reverse restrictions that have been or may be imposed on public compensation by 
recent and pending Supreme Court decisions. The doctrine and the proposed legislation are 
grounded in the unique position and authority of public enforcers, including discretion to select 
between civil penalties and public compensation as monetary remedies, and the deterrence 
rationale of public enforcement. An appendix includes model legislation Congress could adopt to 
clarify and restore public compensation authority across enforcement agencies. 
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Consumers, investors, workers, homeowners, tenants and others receive money as a result of 
civil public enforcement actions. Substantial amounts of money for decades. The Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) alone consistently returns over a billion dollars a year to 
investors. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), the Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”) and the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) return to consumers billions more each 
year. State attorneys general also obtain prolific amounts of public compensation, often by 
joining together in multistate enforcement actions.1  
 
Given this lengthy record of voluminous payments, one would imagine that courts have 
established clear principles for determining when compensation is properly awarded, and which 
individuals receive how much money in various circumstances. There is a discernable doctrine of 
public compensation, yet it is difficult to perceive on an initial reading of the case law. Both 
courts and public enforcers use terminology inconsistently. Most of the basic concepts are 
shrouded in confusion in the case law and in the ever-evolving patchwork of federal and state 
legislation. That public compensation lies abreast of, and shares policy goals with, money 
penalties imposed in civil law enforcement, and abuts claims brought by private litigants, 
deepens the confusion. 
 
Our goal in this Article is to bring clarity to this distinct area of the law in two ways. First, we 
propose a restatement of the doctrine of public compensation. Public compensation rests on two 
distinct theories of redress—disgorgement, which is measured by the unjust gain of the violator; 
and public restitution, which is measured by the loss of the people affected by the violation. The 
proposed doctrine identifies the common principles in existing law for when these two forms of 
public compensation should be available, how much to award, against whom the award can be 
made, and to whom the money should be distributed.  
 
A coherent statement of the law of public compensation is long overdue. Difficult doctrinal 
questions mostly have been waved away by the courts in favor of a practical approach that 
favored the issuance of compensation. No longer. In June 2020, the United States Supreme Court 
issued a decision in an SEC enforcement action restricting the agency’s authority to obtain public 
compensation.2 The Court then promptly granted certiorari to review an FTC enforcement action 
that could lead to the abrogation of the primary authority employed by the FTC to return money 
to consumers.3 The Court’s actions, together with recent decisions of the Third and Seventh 
Circuits overturning decades of precedent, have swiftly unsettled the law of public 
compensation.4 
 
This nascent reversal of judicial approach to public enforcement remedies gives urgency to our 
second goal for this Article. We argue for legislative action to create a consistent set of legal 
principles for the award of public compensation across different public enforcers, and we 
 
1 See supra Part I.B. 
2 Liu v. SEC, 140 S. Ct. 1936, 1940–41, 207 L. Ed. 2d 401 (2020). 
3 F.T.C. v. AMG Capital Mgmt., LLC, 910 F.3d 417, 428 (Nev. 2018), cert. granted sub nom., AMG Capital Mgmt., 
LLC v. F.T.C., 141 S. Ct. 194, 207 L. Ed. 2d 1118 (2020) 
4 See supra Part IV.A. 
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propose a model law to achieve this purpose. No two public enforcers have the same statutory 
authority to award public compensation. Some enforcers having vastly less authority, even 
though there are no clear reasons for the discrepancy. The model law draws from the public 
compensation doctrine, and provides Congress and state legislatures a roadmap for creating a 
common statutory public compensation authority for all enforcement agencies.  
 
Public compensation is rooted in the unique obligations and rights that accompany the executive 
branch duty to implement the law and preserve functioning commerce by deterring violations of 
market protection schemes. Accordingly, disgorgement and public restitution are forms of relief 
that have no application to the law governing private claims. Courts use favorable presumptions 
and shift proof burdens to defendants in ways foreign to the law used by private litigants, even 
when claims of the private plaintiffs arise under the same market protection statutes.  
 
Public compensation law also typically is and, in the absence of contrary statutory authority, 
should be cross-enforcer. The key tenets of public compensation law should apply to the full 
range of civil public enforcement agencies, not just one public enforcer or another. A primary 
reason the current law is difficult to navigate is that courts sometimes treat the regulatory scheme 
of the enforcer seeking public compensation as a discrete area of law, but also unmindfully 
borrow law from other public enforcement regimes, or the law for resolving private claims. This 
segmented and episodic development of caselaw without a cross-enforcer theory of pubic 
compensation has obscured the principles that would otherwise make the law coherent.  
 
The unsettling of the law of public compensation comes at a time when private actions are less 
likely to compensate people affected by violations of market protection laws. In recent years, 
arbitration clauses increasingly bar the courtroom doors to millions of Americans, while at the 
same time courts have steadily restricted the circumstances under which class actions can be 
certified. Limiting public compensation awards mean patterns of illegal activity often will yield 
no compensation to victims of market wrongs, especially in situations involving large numbers 
of people suffering relatively modest harm. Less public compensation coupled with restricted 
access to private rights of action brings us closer to consequence-free violation of civil 
marketplace protection laws. 
 
Part I of the Article describes the practice of public compensation at issue in this Article, and 
looks at the rising importance of public compensation as class actions recede in the face of 
legislative and judicial narrowing of access to the courts. Part II lays out the law of public 
compensation. This Part explores the confusion in cases awarding public compensation under the 
various statutory authorities of public enforcers. We center our analysis on the differences 
between two theories allowing for public compensation—disgorgement and public restitution. 
Both theories are linked to a particular form of statutory authority—disgorgement arises from 
statutory injunctive authority; restitution from an express grant of statutory authority to the 
enforcer.  
 
We propose our restated doctrine of public compensation in Part III. We describe the common 
presumption of causation and the reasonable approximation framework employed by courts in 
determining an enforcer’s right to the relief, making public compensation much easier to obtain 
than compensatory relief in private claims. We then separate this doctrine into the two general 
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theories of disgorgement and public restitution. For each theory, we identify the commonalities 
of when courts award the public compensation, how the courts determine the amount of the 
award, and the eligibility of individuals for the money relief. We also extend the doctrine to 
cover difficult cases of public restitution that have received less development in the case law. 
This Part concludes with examples of how the doctrine would resolve public compensation 
questions in different types of cases. 
 
Part IV examines why the recent decisions limiting or abrogating use of public compensation 
invite years of litigation by enforcement defendants to further restrict the remedial authority of 
public enforcers. Federal courts have long rested the law of public compensation on the 
deterrence rationale of public enforcement and the special position of public enforcers in 
marketplace protection schemes. The recent decisions treat the propriety and limits of public 
compensation as a question of implied statutory equitable authority no different than if the matter 
was raised in a dispute between private litigants. We make a normative argument that public 
compensation law should remain grounded in the critical distinction between a public 
enforcement remedy and the law for adjudication of private claims.  
 
In Part V, we argue that Congress should act to both restore the law of public compensation and 
create uniform remedial authority across enforcement agencies. We identify three concepts that 
underlie our proposed model law and the reasons supporting our view that no public policy 
rationale justifies the existing distinctions between the statutory authority afforded different 
public enforcers. The Appendix contains the proposed legislation. 
 
I. THE PRACTICE OF PUBLIC COMPENSATION 
 
Public compensation is a particular form of money relief available only in public enforcement 
actions. Subpart A places public compensation within the context of remedies available to public 
enforcers and provides examples of typical public compensation awards. Subpart B provides an 
overview of the federal and state public enforces most active in procuring this type of relief. In 
subpart C, we look at the rising importance of public compensation in light of federal judicial 
decisions restricting private plaintiff access to the courts.  
 
 A. Public Compensation as a Public Enforcement Remedy  
  
Almost all public civil law enforcement agencies seek and obtain injunctions restraining future 
violations.5 These enforcers obtain two types of money relief. First, civil penalties, akin to fines, 
are available to public enforcers in almost all cases. Public enforcers regularly use this authority 
and collectively recover billions annually.6 Civil penalty money often is put in the public 
 
5 Samuel W. Buell, Liability and Admissions of Wrongdoing in Public Enforcement Law, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 505, 
515 (2013) (injunctions typical in SEC settlements); Prentiss Cox, Amy Widman & Mark Totten, Strategies of 
Public UDAP Enforcement, 55 HARV. J. ON LEG. 37, 69-70 (2018) (all FTC and CFPB cases and 96% of state 
attorney general UDAP cases resolved in 2014 included injunctive relief). 
6 See Enforcement Data Base, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/payments-harmed-consumers/enforcement-database/ (CFPB has 
collected civil penalties of $1.5 billion); Theresa A. Gabaldon, Equity, Punishment, and the Company You Keep: 
Discerning A Disgorgement Remedy Under the Federal Securities Laws, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 1611, 1633 (2020) 
(SEC); Cox, et al., supra note 5 at 73-74 (state attorneys general obtain civil penalties or other forms of government 
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treasury, but it can be directed into public accounts dedicated to particular uses, including public 
education and future public enforcement.7  
 
Our concern in this article is with the second type of money relief—an award of money to be 
distributed to people affected by the conduct at issue in the enforcement action. Legal scholars 
have called this type of relief “public compensation.”8  
 
Public compensation affects the daily lives of hundreds of millions of Americans by providing 
direct financial redress to those wronged by illegal activity, as well as by creating (or sometimes 
failing to create) incentives to obey the law. Two examples below illustrate how enforcers use 
public compensation in policing law violations across different markets and circumstances. 
 
The FDA is empowered under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) to obtain redress for 
consumers victimized by tainted food, harmful medical devices, or poisonous medicine.9 In U.S. 
v. Universal Management Services, Inc., the FDA’s professional staff identified a company 
marketing a device called “The Stimulator” that the business claimed would alleviate pain from 
migraine headaches, swollen joints, allergies, and other ailments. In fact, “The Stimulator” was 
just an electric gas grill igniter with a handle attached to it that cost about a dollar to produce. 
Americans searching for a cure to their chronic pain purchased about 800,000 “Stimulators” for 
nearly $90 each.10 Universal offered no scientific evidence that it was safe and efficacious, as 
required by the FDCA.11 The District Court ordered Universal to offer all purchasers the 
opportunity to obtain a full refund of the purchase price of the Simulator, and the Sixth Circuit 
affirmed.12 
 
Public compensation is an important tool in government efforts to address poverty and racism. 
For example, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act13 (“DFA”) after the 2008 financial crisis and gave the newly-created CFPB express public 
compensation authority, but also extended similar authority to state attorneys general, state 
 
payment in 73% of cases). The FTC, however, has limited civil penalty authority. See Adjustments to Civil Penalty 
Amounts 86, Fed. Reg. 2539 (proposed Jan. 13, 2021) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
7 Governments sometimes use the same legal authority employed in public enforcement actions to seek recovery of 
money for damage to the public fisc. A notable example of this type of government money is the cases against the 
tobacco industry brought by state attorneys general under consumer protection and antitrust laws in the 1990s based 
on the theory that violations caused the state to expend money for medical costs. See Anthony J. Sebok, Pretext, 
Transparency and Motive in Mass Restitution Litigation, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2177, 2197 (2004). 
8 See Urska Velikonja, Public Compensation for Private Harm: Evidence from the SEC’s Fair Fund Distributions, 
67 STAN. L. REV. 331 (2015) (using term in legal scholarship for first time, perhaps). 
9 See, e.g., U.S. v. Lane Labs-USA Inc., 427 F.3d 219, 223 (3d. Cir. 2005) (affirming disgorgement for false 
advertising for FDA violations). 
10 U.S. v. Universal Management Services, Inc., Corp., 191 F.3d 750, 754 (6th Cir. 1999), aff'd United States v. 
Universal Mgmt. Servs., Corp., 191 F.3d 750 (6th Cir. 1999). 
11 Id. at 763. 21 U.S.C. § 331(a), (k). Under FDA regulations, manufacturers must submit “valid scientific evidence” 
of safety and effectiveness to the FDA prior to sale of a medical device like “The Simulator.” 21 C.F.R. §860.7(d), 
(e). 
12 Id. at 986 (Order ¶19). 
13 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, 15, 22, 31, and 42 
U.S.C. (2020)). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3809786
7 
 
banking regulators, and tribal governments.14 In CFPB and Navajo Nation v. S/W Tax Loans, an 
installment loan company co-located with an H&R Block income tax preparation franchise just 
over the border of the Navajo reservation.15 The company marketed 240 percent interest rate 
loans to low-income native Americans to be repaid out of the proceeds of their federal income 
tax refunds—including many taxpayers who qualified for the Earned Income Tax Credit anti-
poverty program.16 The S/W Tax Loans misled its customers by falsely understating interest 
rates on its loans, and lied about whether the company had received customer income tax refunds 
from the IRS in order to sell unnecessary second or third loans.17 When the CFPB and the 
Navajo nation jointly sued the company, the district court ordered the company to return nearly 
half a million dollars in redress to victims of its illegal activity.18 
 
 B. Government Enforcers of Market Protection Laws  
 
The above examples point to the role that public compensation plays in determining how 
Americans communicate, travel, work, save, borrow, heal, and eat—all aspects of government’s 
role in protecting markets. The prevalence and the dollar volume of these awards is notable. Four 
areas of market regulation in which public compensation regularly occurs are consumer 
protection, investor protection, worker protection, and antitrust enforcement.  
 
Consumer protection. The FTC, the CFPB, and state attorneys general are prolific contributors to 
the recovery of public compensation. These enforcers primarily rely on broad “UDAP” 
authority—statutes that prohibit the use of unfair and deceptive acts and practices in market 
conduct.19 By the middle of 2017, the CFPB had obtained more than $11.5 billion for consumers 
in enforcement actions since its first recovery in 2012.20 The FTC has returned over $1 billion to 
consumers since 2016, and it participated in large cases with other enforcers resulting in over 
$10 billion in public compensation during that period.21 State attorneys general return hundreds 
of millions more each year, including large public compensation awards in multistate actions by 
 
14 12 U.S.C. §§ 5552, 5563-5565; 12 U.S.C. § 5481(27) (defining “state” to include “any federally recognized 
Indian tribe.”). 
15 CFPB & Navajo Nation v. S/W Tax Loans, Inc., No. 15-cv-00299, Complaint at ¶ 7-8(D.N.M. Apr. 14, 2015), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201504_cfpb_complaint-sw-tax-loans.pdf. 
16 Id. at ¶ 12, 22. See also URBAN INSTITUTE & BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, TAX POLICY CENTER’S BRIEFING BOOK 
286 (2020), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/briefing-book/tpc_briefing_book_2020.pdf (“The 
EITC is the single most effective means tested federal antipoverty program for working-age households—providing 
additional income and boosting employment for low-income workers.”). 
17 CFPB & Navajo Nation v. S/W Tax Loans, Inc., Complaint, supra note 15, at ¶ 29. 
18 CFPB & Navajo Nation v. S/W Tax Loans, Inc., No. 15-cv-00299, Stipulated Judgment and Final Order (D.N.M. 
Apr. 16, 2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201504_cfpb_stipulation-sw-tax-loans.pdf. 
19 See generally CAROLYN L. CARTER, CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE STATES: A 50-STATE REPORT ON UNFAIR 
AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES STATUTES (Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr. Feb. 2009). In consumer financial 
services, the Dodd-Frank Act added another A to “UDAAP” by proscribing “abusive” practices alongside deceptive 
and unfair acts. 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d).  
20 See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Enforcing Federal Consumer Protection Law, 
CONSUMERFINANCE.GOV (July 2017), 
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201707_cfpb_factsheet_enforcing-federal-consumer-protection-
laws.pdf. 
21 FTC, FTC Refunds to Consumers, TABLEAU PUBLIC (Feb. 10, 2021), 
https://public.tableau.com/profile/federal.trade.commission#!/vizhome/Refunds_15797958402020/RefundsbyCase. 
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groups of state attorneys general.22 Other enforcers obtaining public compensation for consumer 
protection violations include the FDA,23 HUD,24 the DOJ,25 the ICC,26 and federal prudential 
banking regulators, as well as state regulators with authority over banks, insurers, real estate 
brokers and other financial markets.27  
 
Investor protection/ Securities. Public compensation returned to investors by the SEC regularly 
averages more than $1 billion per year.28 The SEC has been active in obtaining public 
compensation since 1971. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) has become 
increasingly active in obtaining public compensation, ordering $1.3 billion in monetary relief in 
2019.29 State securities regulators enforcing state “blue sky” securities laws, have added 
hundreds of millions more in investor recoveries.30 
 
Worker protection. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) occasionally 
obtains public compensation for violation of federal employment discrimination, but typically 
represents only a single individual or a small group of identifiable employees.31 State attorneys 
general are increasing active in the area of wage theft and worker protection, with eight state 
AGs having established specific units to bring enforcement actions.32 Massachusetts, for 
 
22 See PAUL NOLETTE, FEDERALISM ON TRIAL: STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL AND NATIONAL POLICYMAKING IN 
CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 19-30 (2015); Cox, et al., supra note 5 at 52 (2018). 
23 See supra note 10. 
24 U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Cost Control Mktg. & Sales Mgmt. of Virginia, Inc., 64 F.3d 920, 927 (4th 
Cir. 1995). 
25 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, U.S. Trustee Program Reaches Agreements with Three 
Mortgage Servicers Providing More than $74 Million in Remediation to Homeowners in Bankruptcy (Dec. 7, 2020) 
(https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-trustee-program-reaches-agreements-three-mortgage-servicers-providing-more-
74-million). United States v. Rent Am., Corp., 734 F. Supp. 474, 478 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (awarding public 
compensation in Fair Housing Act enforcement action). 
26 I. C. C. v. B & T Transp. Co., 613 F.2d 1182, 1186 (1st Cir. 1980). 
27 See generally MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44918, WHO REGULATES WHOM? AN OVERVIEW OF 
THE U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK (2020); Congressional Review of OCC Preemption: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 108th Cong. 6-7 (2004) 
(testimony of Gavin M. Gee, Idaho Director Of Finance, on behalf of the Conference of State Bank Supervisors 
describing dual banking system and listing examples of restitution in enforcement actions by numerous state 
banking commissioners); Theodore Allegaert, Derivative Actions by Policyholders on Behalf of Mutual Insurance 
Companies, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1063, 1069 (1996) (noting “[s]tates regulate insurance more than almost any other 
industry, due in part to a near total absence of federal insurance regulation” and “fines and restitution” are common 
remedies obtained by state insurance commissioners). 
28 Velikonja, Public Compensation for Private Harm: Evidence from the SEC’s Fair Fund Distributions, supra note 
8; U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT: A LOOK BACK AT FISCAL YEAR 2017 11 (2017) 
(reporting that, in 2017, $1.07 billion was disbursed to investors.); Gabaldon, supra note 6 at 1621. 
29 Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Division of Enforcement Issues Annual Report for 
FY 2019 (Nov. 25, 2019) (https://cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/8085-
19#:~:text=Highlights%20from%20the%20FY%202019,highest%20total%20in%20CFTC%20history.). 
30 The Role of State Securities Regulators in Protecting Investors: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Aff., S. Hrg. 108-884 (2004) (testimony of Joseph P. Borg) (citing survey of state securities 
regulators finding over $660 million in “restitution, rescission and disgorgement” in 2002 and 2003), available at 
http://www.nasaa.org/872/the-role-of-state-securities-regulators-in-protecting-investors- enforcement-overview/.  
31 See Angela D. Morrison, Duke-ing out Pattern or Practice after Wal-Mart:The EEOC as First, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 
87, 120 (2013).  
32 Terri Gerstein, Worker’s Rights Protections and Enforcement by State Attorneys General, ECONOMIC POLICY 
INSTITUTE (Aug. 27 2020), https://www.epi.org/publication/state-ag-labor-rights-activities-2018-to-2020/. 
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example, recovered $6.7 million in restitution for workers in 2019-2020.33 State attorneys 
general in California, Massachusetts, New York and Pennsylvania filed lawsuits in 2020 seeking 
public compensation for underpayment and misclassification of “gig economy” workers.34  
 
Antitrust. Consumers receive public compensation in antitrust cases, although enforcers in this 
area have shown more reticence in obtaining this relief and antitrust law has split authority for 
consumer recoveries between federal and state enforcers in a peculiar fashion. The two primary 
federal enforcers are the FTC and the DOJ, and neither has consistently sought public 
compensation in antitrust actions.35 Unlike UDAP enforcement, the FTC has an inconsistent 
history of pursuing public compensation.36 State attorneys general have an important and unusual 
role in obtaining public compensation in antitrust enforcement, including power to obtain public 
compensation for Clayton Act antitrust violations in recognition of the limits on federal authority 
and private class recoveries.37 Given the peculiarities of the law and practice of antitrust public 
compensation, we focus on the other types of enforcers in the remainder of the article. 
 C. The Rising Importance of Public Compensation in Policing the Market  
 
In recent decades, public compensation has become increasingly important to the credibility and 
effectiveness of civil law market protection regimes. The vast majority of Americans cannot 
afford to retain private counsel to assist them in dealing with civil legal problems.38 Nearly 
ninety percent of low-income Americans with civil legal problems report receiving “inadequate 
or no legal help” leaving them without practical access to the court system in civil cases.39 And 
the federally-funded Legal Services Corporation turns away more than 50% of qualifying 
consumers seeking legal help because of lack resources.40 Most low-income Americans feel so 
 
33 Press Release, Office of Attorney Gen. Maura Healey, AG Healey Issues Labor Day Report on Office’s Efforts to 
Combat Wage Theft, Protect Workers (Sept. 7, 2020) (https://www.mass.gov/news/ag-healey-issues-labor-day-
report-on-offices-efforts-to-combat-wage-theft-protect-workers-1) 
34 Gerstein, supra note 32. 
35 Shari Ross Lahlou, Greg Luib & Michael Weiner, High Stakes at the High Court: The FTC's Disgorgement 
Authority Comes Before the Supreme Court, 35 ANTITRUST 71, 72 n.14 (Fall 2020); 
36 Gerald A. Stein, Understanding the FTC's Monetary Equitable Remedies Under Section 13(b) for Antitrust 
Violations, 34 ANTITRUST 59, 60 (Fall 2019) (“The FTC brought only two actions for monetary equitable remedies 
involving alleged antitrust violations during the 30-year period from 1973 to 2003.”); Compare Policy Statement on 
Monetary Equitable Remedies in Competition Cases, 68 Fed. Reg. 45,821 (Aug. 4, 2003), 2003 WL 21780660 
(stating reticence to pursue public compensation) with FTC Statement of the Commission Effecting the Withdrawal 
of the Commission’s Policy Statement on Monetary Equitable Remedies in Competition Cases, 77 Fed. Reg. 47,070 
(Aug. 7, 2012). Since 2012, the FTC sought public compensation in at least six cases and has obtained about $1.8 
billion in those cases. Stein, supra note 36 at 61, although a recent appeal overturned $448 million of this amount. 
FTC v. Abbvie, Inc., 976 F.3d 327, 338 (3d Cir. 2020). 
37 15 U.S.C. §15c (2012); Susan Beth Farmer, More Lessons from the Laboratories: Cy Pres Distributions in Parens 
Patriae Antitrust Actions Brought by State Attorneys General, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 361, 376-79 (1999); State of 
N.Y. by Vacco v. Reebok Int'l Ltd., 96 F.3d 44, 46 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Congress empowered state attorneys general to 
investigate and prosecute antitrust abuses on behalf of consumers stymied by Rule 23's certification and notification 
hurdles.”). See generally U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL VII-10 (5TH ED. 2016). 
38 Ian Weinstein, Access to Civil Justice in America: What Do We Know?, BEYOND ELITE LAW: ACCESS TO CIVIL 
JUSTICE IN AMERICA at 3-20 (S. Estreicher & J. Radice, Eds., 2016). 
39 LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION: THE JUSTICE GAP: MEASURING THE UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-
INCOME AMERICANS at 6 (2017) (hereinafter THE JUSTICE GAP). 
40 LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, FY 2017 BUDGET REQUEST (2016), https://lsc-
live.app.box.com/LSCFY2017BudRequest. 
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excluded from the justice system they do not try to obtain access to counsel, even though seven 
in ten with recent personal experience of a civil legal problem say it has “significantly affected 
their lives.”41 Moderate-income Americans fare little better. LSC attorneys can only serve those 
with incomes of no more than 125% of the federal poverty line. Most middle-income families 
face civil legal problems without counsel and the COVID pandemic will strain already 
inadequate pro bono and low bono resources for years to come.42  
 
Even when people with valid claims do obtain a lawyer, forced confidential arbitration hobbles 
private enforcement of market protection regimes. The Federal Arbitration Act makes an 
agreement to submit a dispute to arbitration binding as a matter of federal law.43 Although 
Congress adopted the statute in 1925, it has only been in recent decades that the prevalence of 
arbitration clauses throughout many markets has begun to fundamentally reshape the ability of 
individual Americans to use private rights of action. A 2015 CFPB study found at least 92 
percent of the prepaid card market, 99 percent of the mobile wireless carrier market, 86 percent 
private student loan market, and 99 percent loans originated by storefront payday loan companies 
were subject to arbitration clauses.44 The same CFPB study found no evidence arbitration clauses 
lead to lower prices, and that three out of four consumers were unaware their product or service 
included a forced arbitration clause.45 In addition to closing off judicial recourse, forced 
arbitration reduces the opportunity for private development of a traditional Anglo-American 
jurisprudence of market protection law based on stare decisis.46 Because consumer arbitrations 
are almost always confidential, each individual consumer is left to her own devices and is forced 
to relitigate the same theories of liability and redress in each arbitration.47 
 
Private enforcement of market protection laws also is increasingly hobbled by class action 
restrictions. In 1997, the Supreme Court explained that “the very core of the class action 
mechanism” is “to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for 
an individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights. A class action solves this 
problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth 
someone’s (usually an attorney’s) labor.”48 Today, in many markets, class actions no longer 
solve any problem because they do not exist. The CFPB’s study found that over 90 percent of 
 
41 THE JUSTICE GAP, supra note 39, at 7 (“Low-income Americans seek professional legal help for only 20% of the 
civil legal problems they face.”). 
42 Kathryn Joyce, No Money, No Lawyer, No Justice: The Vast Hidden Inequities of the Civil Justice System, NEW 
REPUBLIC, June 22, 2020, https://newrepublic.com/article/158095/civil-legal-system-no-money-no-lawyer-no-
justice. 
43 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
44 CFPB, Fact Sheet: Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Study Finds That Arbitration Agreements Limit 
Relief for Consumers at 1, March 15, 2015, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_factsheet_arbitration-
study.pdf (hereinafter CFPB Arbitration Fact Sheet). 
45 Id. at 2-4. 
46 Myriam Gilles, The Day Doctrine Died: Private Arbitration and the End of Law, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 371, 372 
(2016). 
47 Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Going Private: Technology, Due Process, and Internet Dispute Resolution, 34 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 151, 206 (2000). 
48 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windson, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997). 
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arbitration agreements expressly prohibit class arbitrations.49 In AT&T v. Conception the 
Supreme Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted state laws, such as the 
unconscionability doctrine, that might otherwise prohibit these boilerplate contracts from 
disallowing class-wide representation in arbitration.50 As Miryam Giles observed, “class actions 
brought by or on behalf of low-income consumers and employees are on the verge of 
disappearing.”51  
 
In the remaining pockets of law where class actions are still viable, courts have erected new and 
expanding barriers to certification. The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 made it easier for 
defendants to remove class actions asserting state law claims in state court to federal court, 
preventing state courts from applying law that may make class certification more likely.52 In 
2011, the Supreme Court decision in Wal-Mart v. Dukes adopted a narrow and highly restrictive 
interpretation of the commonality requirement for class certification.53 Class action defense 
litigators argue the decision “[p]roperly understood, . . . represents a fundamental change in class 
action jurisprudence that will have a wide-ranging effect on class actions for years to come.”54 
And, many courts now follow an increasingly muscular jurisprudence of class ascertainability, 
prohibiting  class certification in the absence of “reliable proof of purchase or a knowable list of 
injured plaintiffs,” resulting in fewer class actions arising from small retail purchases.55 
 
Collectively, these trends make private enforcement of market protection law increasingly 
unreliable and leave public civil law enforcement agencies as a last line of defense in market 
protection. Accordingly, public enforcement has become an indispensable backstop to remedy 






49 CFPB Arbitration Fact Sheet, supra note 44, at 3. And, those arbitration agreements that did not prohibit class 
arbitrations were drafted by smaller companies that together represented 3 percent or less of their respective 
markets. Id. at 3. 
50 See also Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v 
Conception, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 651 (2012). 
51 Myriam Gilles, Class Warfare: The Disappearance of Low-Income Litigants from the Civil Docket, 65 EMORY 
L.J. 1531, 1535 (2016). One civil docket where low- and moderate-income Americans are still found in abundance 
are small claims courts where debt collection lawsuits often make up the overwhelming majority of claims. In some 
states, arbitration clauses preserve the ability of creditors to sue in small claims court where they can obtain bench 
warrants to arrest debtors who do not respond to collection subpoenas. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. PETERSON & 
DAVID MCNEILL, CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA, UNWARRANTED: SMALL CLAIMS COURT ARREST 
WARRANTS IN PAYDAY LOAN DEBT COLLECTION at 2-3 (February 2020) (study showing payday lenders and other 
high-cost creditors account for over 68 percent of all Utah small-claims court hearings leading to thousands of arrest 
warrants for low-income borrowers each year). 
52 28 U.S.C. § 1453. Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Consequences of CAFA: Challenges and Opportunities for the Just, 
Speedy, and Inexpensive Determination of Class and Mass Actions, 13 SEDONA CONF. J. 181, 183 (2012). 
53 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 367 (2011) (rejecting the use of statistical sampling to establish 
commonality under rule 23 as an impermissible “trial by formula”). 
54 Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. & Bradley J. Hamburger, Three Myths About Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 82 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 45, 58 (2014). 
55  Myriam Gilles, Class Dismissed: Contemporary Judicial Hostility to Small-Claims Consumer Class Actions, 
59 DEPAUL L. REV. 305, 310 (2010). See, e.g., Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 304 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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II. THE LAW OF PUBLIC COMPENSATION  
  
With limited exceptions, public compensation is rooted in statutory grants of authority to public 
enforcers.56 This statutory authority, however, does little to clarify the requisites for, and limits 
on, obtaining public compensation. Rather, the statutes incorporate broad grants of authority that 
courts have shaped into particular rights to public compensation.  
 
Subpart A looks at the confusion in nomenclature that envelopes this area of law. The two most 
common terms employed are disgorgement and restitution. Public enforcers and courts, however, 
mix and match these terms—and other labels, like unjust enrichment and consumer redress—
which results in confusion about how public compensation should be determined, and confusion 
about how this determination relates to the statutory authority for public compensation. In 
Subpart B, we explain why the case law, muddled as it is, justifies the rationalization of public 
compensation into two distinct categories based on different measures and different types of 
statutory authority for the award, as follows: 
 
(1) Statutory injunctive authority authorizes disgorgement, which is measured by the unjust 
gain of the law violator.  
 
(2) Statutory express compensation authorizes public restitution, which is measured by 
the loss of the consumer resulting from the law violation. 
 
Subparts C and D examine disgorgement and public restitution as so defined, respectively.  
 
 A. Confusion in Public Compensation Law 
 
Scholars, judges and practitioners often express bewilderment when first encountering the law of 
public compensation. Courts and enforcers use terms to mean different things; and those terms 
have yet other meanings in the law governing private claims.  
 
Nowhere is this confusion more pronounced than in use of “disgorgement” and “restitution.”57  
Some courts maintain that these terms have distinct meanings.58 Many courts use the terms 
interchangeably, or are explicitly disinterested in making a distinction.59 Still other courts refer to 
 
56 Federal enforcers rely exclusively on statutory authority. State attorneys general also overwhelmingly rely on 
statutory authority for UDAP enforcement, but New Mexico uses general common law power.  DEE PRIDGEN & 
RICHARD ALDERMAN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW app. 7A (2016-17) (showing only New Mexico lacks 
some form of statutory authority for consumer restitution). Even in state antitrust enforcement—the odd duck of 
public compensation sometimes based on parens patriae authority-- statutory authority still predominates. In re 
Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 205 F.R.D. 369, 386-388 (D.D.C. 2002) (determining that 30 of the 51 
states sought public compensation based on statutory authority). 
57 George P. Roach, A Default Rule of Omnipotence: Implied Jurisdiction and Exaggerated Remedies in Equity for 
Federal Agencies, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1, 6 (2007) (analyzing FTC, SEC, CFTC, DOE and FDA cases 
and noting that inconsistencies in outcomes can be “traced back to the widespread confusion about the meanings of 
specific terms pertaining to either remedies in equity, at law, or both.”). 
58 See, e.g., Texas Am. Oil Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 44 F.3d 1557, 1569–70 (Fed. Cir.1995); SEC v. Huffman, 
996 F.2d 800, 802 (5th Cir. 1993). 
59 SEC v. First Pacific Bancorp, 142 F.3d 1186, 1192–93 (9th Cir. 1998) (“We need not engage in a rather scholastic 
argument about whether restitution and disgorgement are really just about the same thing.”). See Verity Winship, 
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“damages” when awarding restitution or disgorgement.60 The Second Circuit has described the 
existing case law as plagued by “conceptual bleed” in the use of these terms.61 The First Circuit 
noted the confusion in the use of these terms and stated that “[w]e urge the district court to more 
clearly define these concepts in the future.”62. In the above-described FDA case, the agency and 
the district court grappled with whether to characterize the relief as disgorgement or restitution, 
with the court deciding that the term “restitution” was a better fit to deter violations.63 
 
Even more confusing, some enforcers have multiple sources of statutory authority for public 
compensation; the FTC being the most prominent.64 Most courts distinguish between the 
different types of authority, but numerous courts cite to cases using one type of authority for 
support of a legal principle of the other type of authority, either knowingly or without noting the 
category confusion.65 Courts have allowed enforcers to choose among their various grants of 
authority, but recent decisions have taken a contrary position.66 
 
The practice of the CFPB adds another dimension to the puzzle. It uses the terms restitution or 
redress to mean public compensation, but cases adjudicating CFPB public compensation rely on 
both disgorgement and restitution case law from the FTC and other enforcers. And the CFPB 
reserves the term disgorgement to connote money returned to the government rather than 
consumers.67 
 
State enforcers typically have express statutory authority to obtain public compensation, but it is 
common for state court decisions to borrow from federal law in analyzing the scope of that 
relief.68 For example, in a recent case awarding public compensation to defrauded trade school 
students, the Minnesota Supreme Court called the relief sought “equitable restitution…, not 
money damages,” and justified the relief as based on a disgorgement theory that the public 
compensation was “intended to force a wrongdoer to divest money improperly gained.”69 It cited 
variously to the following as support for its holding: (1) CFTC and FTC cases as authority for 
public compensation based on the illegal gain of the law violator, but also relied heavily on a 
 
Fair Funds and the SEC's Compensation of Injured Investors, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1103, 1112 (2008) (courts sometimes 
use the terms “disgorgement” and “restitution” interchangeably in SEC cases). See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Febre, 128 F.3d 
530, 536 (7th Cir. 1997) (using disgorgement, restitution and damages interchangeably). 
60  See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Direct Mktg. Concepts, Inc., 624 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2010); SEC v. Brown, 658 F.3d 858, 860 
(8th Cir. 2011). 
61 F.T.C. v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 654 F.3d 359 (2d Cir. 2011). 
62 Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. JBW Capital, 812 F.3d 98, 111 n.21 (1st Cir. 2016) 
63 Universal Management Services, Inc., 191 F.3d at internal. 
64 See Rohit Chopra & Samuel A.A. Levine, The Case for Resurrecting the FTC Act’s Penalty Offense Authority, U. 
PENN. L. REV. at 14, (forthcoming 2021), available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3721256 (providing an 
overview of Federal Trade Commission Act provisions allowing monetary relief).  
65 See, e.g., Roach, supra note 57 at 14-15 (discussing cases in which an FTC case decided under its authority to 
obtain public compensation based on consumer law is cited in FTC cases based on its authority to obtain 
disgorgement). 
66 See infra Part V.A. 
67 See infra Part II.D.1.  
68 See, e.g., State ex rel. Kidwell v. Master Distributors, Inc., 101 Idaho 447, 455, 615 P.2d 116, 124 (1980) 
(interpreting state statute based on FTC express statutory authority but citing to SEC disgorgement authority based 
solely in equity). 
69 State v. Minnesota Sch. of Bus., Inc., 935 N.W.2d 124, 138–39 (Minn. 2019). 
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case about the FTC’s statutory authority to order redress measured by consumer loss;70 (2) that 
the AG and defendants agreed that the case law interpreting the authority of private parties to 
obtain damages on proof of a “causal nexus” was relevant for determining public compensation, 
while emphasizing that the proof required here was lesser because the case “was brought by the 
Minnesota Attorney General rather than by a private plaintiff;”71 and (3) that the award allowed a 
Special Master to make individual determinations on consumer reliance when the defendant 
objected to a claim filed by the consumer, while noting that the public compensation ordered 
here was “aimed as much (or more) at preventing the wrongdoer from profiting from its 
misdeeds as it is to make the injured party whole.”72 None of this is to suggest that the reasoning 
of the court was incorrect—quite the contrary, as it is more thoroughly reasoned than almost any 
comparable state court decision—but rather that the doctrine underlying public compensation 
uses a confusing mix of terminology and concepts.  
 
Finally, the term restitution has meaning in other areas of law, which adds to the difficulty in 
making sense of this law. It is a claim in the law of unjust enrichment.73 It is a form of remedy in 
contract law.74 Many states have statutory schemes allowing criminal prosecutors to seek civil 
restitution for crime victims following criminal convictions.75 Although this law is of doubtful 
relevance to public compensation, it is occasionally applied in public compensation, further 
complicating the meaning of the law.76 
 
The remainder of this part is aimed at bringing a base-level clarity to the law of public 
compensation by defining disgorgement and public restitution as distinct forms of public 
compensation linked (mostly) to distinct forms of statutory authority. 
 
 B. Disgorgement and Restitution Defined 
 
The predominant and best use of the term “disgorgement” is to mean public compensation 
measured solely by the gains of the law violator and authorized by statutory injunctive authority.  
In Liu, discussed below, the Supreme Court observed that SEC public compensation was initially 
labelled “restitution,” but that “[o]ver the years, the SEC has continued to request this remedy, 
later referred to as “disgorgement, and courts have continued to award it.”77 The SEC has 
 
70 Id. at 133.  
71 Id. at 136. (citing FTC v. Figgie Int’l, Inc). 
72 Id. at 139. 
73 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 (2011); Emily Sherwin, 
Restitution and Equity: An Analysis of the Principle of Unjust Enrichment, 79 TEX. L. REV. 2083 (2001). 
74 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 371 (1981); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT App. A No. 7 (2010). 
75 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137.106 (West); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-603; LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. 
Art. 895.1. 
76 Infra Part IV.B.1. 
77 Liu v. SEC, 140 S. Ct. 1936, 1940–41, 207 L. Ed. 2d 401 (2020).  
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developed policies that expressly distinguish disgorgement and restitution in this way.78 Courts 
cite to disgorgement cases across types of enforcers in awarding and defining disgorgement.79  
While some courts and litigants confusingly label disgorgement as restitution, the reverse rarely 
occurs, suggesting some agreement that disgorgement is a narrower term, consistent with the 
meaning defined here. 
 
The alternative to measuring public compensation by the unjust gain of the defendant is to award 
this relief based on the loss of the consumer. The best use of the term “public restitution” is for 
public compensation so measured and authorized by express statutory authority. We use the term 
“restitution” because the overwhelmingly weight of judicial decisions use this term when 
referring to public compensation based on consumer loss.80 We add the word “public” to clarify 
that this remedy, as authorized in the law governing public enforcement actions, is not available 
as a remedy for private litigants. 
In the DFA, Congress constructed explicit statutory authority for the CFTC consistent with this 
dichotomy between disgorgement and restitution. The CFTC now has statutory authority to 
obtain “equitable remedies including--(A) restitution to persons who have sustained losses 
proximately caused by such violation (in the amount of such losses); and (B) disgorgement of 
gains received in connection with such violation.”81 In determining remedies in CFTC cases, 
courts have emphasized that disgorgement is to be measured by ill-gotten gain of the violator and 
restitution by investor loss.82 
Assigning these meanings to disgorgement and public restitution allows for a clear, consistent 
link between the measure for awarding public compensation and the sources of statutory 
authority for that award. Subpart C describes how disgorgement is a unique remedy available 
only in public enforcement that has developed from seventy-years of case law interpreting 
statutory injunctive authority granted to public enforcers. Subpart D describes the more diverse 
 
78 U.S. SEC, REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 308(C) OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, at 1 n. 2, available at 
https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/sox308creport.pdf  (“Courts may at times use the terms disgorgement and 
restitution interchangeably and may on occasions equate them… However, the concepts are distinct. Restitution is 
intended to make investors whole, and disgorgement is meant to deprive the wrongdoer of their ill-gotten 
gain.”)(citations omitted). See Urska Velikonja, Public Enforcement After Kokesh: Evidence from SEC Actions, 108 
GEO. L.J. 389, 399–400 (2019) (“Unlike restitution, which aims to make investors whole, disgorgement aims to 
deprive the wrongdoer of ill-gotten gain.”) 
79 See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d 466, 470 (11th Cir. 1996) (FTC action citing SEC and CFTC case 
law); Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Gordon, 819 F.3d 1179, 1195 (9th Cir. 2016) (CFPB case citing SEC and FTC 
cases); Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Zurixx, LLC, 441 F. Supp. 3d 1216, 1223 (D. Utah 2020) (FTC action citing FDA 
case); SEC v. Durante, 2013 WL 6800226, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2013) (SEC case citing FTC cases).  
80 For purposes of this article, we use “consumer loss” as short-hand for the loss of any person affected by the law 
violation, including an investor, worker, homeowner or tenant. 
81 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1(d)(3). The CFPB authority for public compensation also created in the Dodd Frank Act generally 
comports with this distinction, also the CFPB has construed disgorgement and restitution to have different meanings. 
See infra Part II.C.1. 
82 Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. JBW Capital, 812 F.3d 98, 111 (1st Cir. 2016). See also 
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. S. Tr. Metals, Inc., 894 F.3d 1313, 1331–32 (11th Cir. 2018) (denying 
restitution to the CFTC under this authority for lack of the requisite “proximate cause” for investor loss, but 
encouraging the district court to “consider on remand whether disgorgement is appropriate.”). 
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and less-defined public restitution authority expressly granted in statutes empowering public 
enforcers. 
 C. Statutory Injunctive Authority and Disgorgement 
  
Statutory injunctive authority is available to all enforcers. Although courts have inherent 
authority to issue an injunction to restrain violations, courts and scholars generally conclude that 
statutory authorization eliminates prerequisites of traditional equitable relief, or otherwise 
loosens standards for issuing an injunction.83 Beginning with the seminal United States Supreme 
Court 1946 decision in Porter v. Warner Holding Co.,84 courts have recognized that statutory 
injunctions also authorize disgorgement of money by law violators. 
 
  1. All Roads Lead to Porter 
 
The Office of Price Administration (OPA) was an agency created in World War II and entrusted 
with enforcement of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 (EPCA). Porter, the OPA 
Administrator, brought an action against a landlord charging rents in excess of the price controls 
and sought a return of money to the tenants in the amount of the excess rent. The lower courts 
rejected the claim for public compensation in the absence of express statutory authority. The 
Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that “a decree compelling one to disgorge profits, rents 
or property acquired in violation of the EPCA may properly be entered by a District Court once 
its equity jurisdiction has been invoked under” the OPA.85 The Court based its holding on the 
broad equity powers of the courts invoked by section 205 of the EPCA, to grant “a permanent or 
temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order.”86 
 
Central to the Court’s holding was that the lawsuit was a public enforcement action. The Court 
stated that “since the public interest is involved in a proceeding of this nature, those equitable 
powers assume an even broader and more flexible character than when only a private 
controversy is at stake.”87 The Court determined that the grant of statutory authorization to a 
public enforcer, and the consequent public purpose of deterrence through enforcement actions, 
underlie the propriety of public compensation: “[i]n framing such remedies under s 205(a), 
courts must act primarily to effectuate the policy of the Emergency Price Control Act and to 
protect the public interest while giving necessary respect to the private interests involved.”88 
 
The Court followed Porter with two decisions that extended the reach of disgorgement. In  
United States v. Moore, the Court held that return of excess rent was properly ordered under the 
EPCA even when an injunction was improper because the price controls had been rescinded after 
the violations of the Act had occurred. In Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., the Court 
 
83Jared A. Goldstein, Equitable Balancing in the Age of Statutes, 96 VA. L. REV. 485, 488 (2010) (arguing that 
“equitable balancing in statutory cases should be abandoned because it conflicts with separation of powers 
principles”); Daniel A. Farber, Equitable Discretion, Legal Duties, and Environmental Injunctions, 45 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 513 (1984); Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Statutory Violations and Equitable Discretion, 70 CAL. L. REV. 524 (1982). 
84 328 U.S. 395 (1946). 
85 Id. at 397. 
86 Id. at 399. 
87 Id. at 398. 
88 Id. at 400. 
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held that DOL had authority under the Fair Labor Standards Act to order “reimbursement,” 
consistent with Porter, to employees subject to retaliation for reporting violations.89  
 
  2. Enforcers Using Statutory Injunctive Authority 
 
Federal enforcers rely heavily, and often exclusively, on disgorgement to obtain public 
compensation. The SEC initiated the modern era of disgorgement in 1971 by obtaining this 
remedy in its enforcement action against Texas Gulf Sulphur.90 The Second Circuit cited to 
Porter, Moore and Mitchell as authority: “the Supreme Court has upheld the power of the 
Government without specific statutory authority to seek restitution, and has upheld the lower 
courts in granting restitution, as an ancillary remedy in the exercise of the courts' general equity 
powers to afford complete relief.”91 The SEC has multiple sources of statutory equitable 
authority permitting the Commission to apply to federal courts to obtain an injunction.92 
 
All of the other federal public enforcers use disgorgement authority traceable to Porter and 
Texas Gulf Sulphur. In 1979, the Seventh Circuit became the first court to recognize CFTC 
disgorgement authority, citing Porter and Texas Gulf Sulphur.93 The FTC disgorgement 
authority exists in section 13 of the FTC Act, which provides the court authority to issue a 
permanent injunction “in proper cases.”94 Federal courts have for decades awarded the FTC 
disgorgement based on this statute and the Court’s reasoning in Porter, repeatedly rejecting 
challenges to the contrary, until recent successful challenges.95 The FDA relies on statutory 
authority to “restrain violations” and obtain injunctive relief as authority for disgorgement.96 The 
FDA’s initial attempts to obtain this remedy failed before district courts, but in 1999 the Sixth 
Circuit, citing Porter and Mitchell, rejected these cases and awarded disgorgement to 
consumers.97 Federal courts also have invoked Porter in awarding disgorgement to the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)98 and the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC)99 in civil law enforcement actions. Although most state attorneys general 
rely on express statutory authority, some state courts have relied on Porter in holding that a 
 
89 Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960). 
90 Barbara Black, Should the SEC Be A Collection Agency for Defrauded Investors?, 63 BUS. LAW. 317, 320 (2008). 
91 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1307 (2d Cir. 1971). 
92 See Gabaldon, supra note 6 at 1616-1619 (describing the development of SEC statutory injunctive authority used 
to obtain disgorgement). 
93 Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Hunt, 591 F.2d 1211, 1221-1223 (7th Cir. 1979) 
94 15 U.S.C.§ 53(b). 
95 David C. Vladeck, Time to Stop Digging: Failed Attacks on FTC Authority to Obtain Consumer Redress, 31 
ANTITRUST 89 (Fall 2016); J. Howard Beales III & Timothy J. Muris, Striking the Proper Balance: Redress Under 
Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, 79 Antitrust L.J. 1, 24 (2013). In 2020, two circuits overturned precedent allowing 
FTC disgorgement, and the question is now before the Supreme Court. See infra Part IV.A. 
96 21 U.S.C. § 332. 
97 United States v. Universal Mgmt. Servs., Corp., 191 F.3d 750, 763 (6th Cir. 1999). See also U.S. v. Lane Labs-
USA Inc., 427 F.3d 219, 223 (3d. Cir. 2005); U.S. v. Rx Depot, Inc., 438 F.3d 1052, 1061 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(“disgorgement is authorized by the FDCA.”). 
98 See Pierce v. Amaral, 938 F.2d 94, 95-96 (8th Cir. 1991). 
99 Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Powhatan Energy Fund, LLC, 345 F. Supp. 3d 682, 688 (E.D. Va. 2018), aff'd 
and remanded, 949 F.3d 891 (4th Cir. 2020). 
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statutory injunction provision authorizes public compensation for attorneys general and other 
state enforcers.100 
 
Courts rarely reject, and only occasionally trim, federal enforcer requests for disgorgement.101 
Although courts have rejected the full amount of enforcer requests for public compensation, that 
is the exception rather than the rule.102 
 
  3. Liu: Disruption and Reaffirmation, With Limits  
 
Despite Porter and decades of favorable judicial decisions thereafter across multiple market 
protection enforcement schemes, scholars and other commentators have repeatedly challenged 
whether a statutory grant of authority to an enforcer to a seek an injunction can empower courts 
to award disgorgement.103 The Supreme Court’s 2020 decision in Liu v. SEC should end that 
debate in favor of allowing disgorgement as public compensation, yet this decision also 
establishes limits on obtaining this relief.104 
 
In 2013 and 2107, the Supreme Court decided two cases limiting SEC enforcement authority. 
The first case, Gabelli v. SEC, held that the five-year limitation period on civil penalties should 
be measured by commission of the violation, not discovery by the SEC.105 The second case, 
Kokesh v. SEC, extended this holding to disgorgement awards. The Court held that disgorgement 
 
100 CAROLYN CARTER & JONATHON SHELDON, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES §13.5.4.1 (8th ed. 
2012). (“[O]verwhelming majority of courts find it within their equitable power to grant restitution as relief even 
when this is not provided for in the UDAP statute.”). State public enforcement cases often cite Porter as authority 
for awarding disgorgement based on statutory injunctive authority. See, e.g., State By & Through McGraw v. 
Imperial Mktg., 506 S.E.2d 799, 811-12 (W. Va. 1998); Commonwealth ex rel. Terry v. Virginia Telemarketing, 
Inc., 15 Va. Cir. 489 (1989) (disgorgement proper in charities fraud); State v. Bob Chambers Ford, Inc., 522 A.2d 
362, 366–67 (Me. 1987) (“[t]he court's equitable powers assume an especially broad and flexible character when, as 
here, the public interest is involved”); State ex rel. Day v. Sw. Mineral Energy, Inc., 617 P.2d 1334, 1338 (1980) 
(“the State of Oklahoma may require those violating the Securities Act to disgorge themselves of their unlawful 
profits.”); Seaboard Sur. Co. v. Ralph Williams' Nw. Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 81 Wash. 2d 740, 744, 504 P.2d 
1139, 1142 (1973). But see State v. Jonathan Logan, Inc., 301 Md. 63, 72, 482 A.2d 1, 6 (1984) (refusing to apply 
Porter absent state statute expressly authorizing public compensation). 
101 Only the CFPB has been denied any requested public compensation in a substantial number of its public 
enforcement cases. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Nationwide Biweekly Administration, Inc., No. 15-CV-02106-
RS, 2017 WL 3948396, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2017); Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. CashCall, Inc., No. 
CV1507522JFWRAOX, 2018 WL 485963, at *14 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2018). See also F.T.C. v. AMREP Corp., 705 
F. Supp. 119, 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (denying summary judgment to the FTC because of variation in defendant 
conduct). 
102 Among the few courts accepting an enforcer right to disgorgement, but rejecting the full request for disgorgement 
are the following: F.T.C. v. Verity Int'l, Ltd., 443 F.3d 48, 69–70 (2d Cir. 2006) (trimming slightly FTC award 
because it failed to account for funds received by middlemen rather than directly paid to defendant); SEC v. Wyly, 
56 F. Supp. 3d 260, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (finding “no evidence here that the defendants' unlawful conduct—that is, 
the scheme to hide beneficial ownership by failing to disclose transactions—resulted in any market distortion, price 
impact, or profit tied to the violation,” yet remanding to allow the SEC to present further proof); SEC v. Seghers, 
404 F. App'x 863, 864 (5th Cir. 2010) (agreeing that looser proof requirements apply, but affirming that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the SEC failed to provide sufficient proof after initial reversal and 
remand of district court decision).  
103 See infra Part IV.C. 
104 Liu v. SEC, 140 S. Ct. 1936 (2020). 
105 Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. 442 (2013). 
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operated as a penalty as employed in that case, and thus was subject to the same five-year 
limitations period.106 Importantly for our purposes, footnote 3 in Kokesh ominously stated that 
“[n]othing in this opinion should be interpreted as an opinion on whether courts possess authority 
to order disgorgement in SEC enforcement proceedings.”107  
In July 2020, Liu settled the question left dangling in Kokesh. It established two “principles” for 
understanding disgorgement as public compensation. “First, equity practice long authorized 
courts to strip wrongdoers of their ill-gotten gains, with scholars and courts using various labels 
for the remedy.”108 The Court firmly grounded disgorgement in the equity powers of courts. In 
doing so, it waived away an analysis of the distinctions between different labels of equitable 
remedies, holding that disgorgement of ill-gotten profits was a proper result “[n]o matter the 
label” or “whatever the name.”109 Liu, therefore, rejects the position of commentators who 
argued that public compensation under statutory injunctive authority does not comport with the 
nuance of claims and remedies in equity.110 
The second principle enunciated in Liu is that “to avoid transforming an equitable remedy into a 
punitive sanction,” and thus exceeding the proper bounds of equity, disgorgement is subject to 
three limits that the Court suggests some prior SEC disgorgement awards may have exceeded: 
(1) that disgorgement “be awarded for victims” and not “deposited in Treasury funds;” (2) that 
the amount is no more than an “individual wrongdoer’s net profits,” after deduction for 
“legitimate expenses from the receipts of fraud;” and (3) that disgorgement does not impose 
joint-and-several liability, but rather liability is based on individual wrong-doing.  
The first limit—that disgorgement must be awarded to victims—was based on particular 
language in the SEC statutory injunctive authority limiting equitable relief to that which “may be 
appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors.”111 Accordingly, it is unclear that this 
restriction has meaning in actions by public enforcers other than SEC.  
But the holding in Liu that disgorgement is based in traditional equity, and therefore is limited to 
net profits and individual wrong-doing as defined by common law, should reshape the law of 
disgorgement in public enforcement.112 Liu suggests a closer alignment of disgorgement with the 
traditional doctrines of private equity than the remedy strongly rooted in public enforcement 
enunciated in Porter and broadened through decades of court decisions. As one commentator 
 
106 Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017). Scholars immediately began estimating the impact of Kokesh on SEC 
disgorgement recoveries. See Velikonja, Public Enforcement After Kokesh: Evidence from SEC Actions, supra note 
78 (finding that Kokesh will impact about 34% of cases, including precluding a disgorgement award in about 3% of 
cases; and comparing this finding to other scholars who estimated “minimal” effect or a decrease of disgorgement of 
about 20% in insider trading cases).  
107 Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1642 n.3 (2017). See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Kokesh Footnote Three Notwithstanding: 
The Future of the Disgorgement Penalty in SEC Cases, 56 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 17 (2018). 
108 Liu, at 1942 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5). 
112 See generally Jennifer J. Schulp, Liu v. SEC: Limiting Disgorgement, but by How Much?, CATO SUP. CT. REV., 
2019-2020. 
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concluded, Liu likely will make disgorgement “more difficult to obtain,” and when it is awarded, 
it will be “for more limited sums.”113   
  4. Express Disgorgement Authority and SEC Fair Funds 
 
Congress swiftly responded to Liu with a change to SEC statutory authority in January 2021. 
“Tucked away in the 1,400-page…override (of) a presidential veto of the National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA),” was an amendment to the primary SEC remedial authority.114 This 
amendment added the following two provisions aimed at clarifying and strengthening the SEC’s 
disgorgement authority in light of Liu: (1) adding a new paragraph (7) to its remedial authority 
stating that “the Commission may seek, and any Federal court may order, disgorgement;” and (2) 
providing jurisdiction to courts to “require disgorgement under paragraph (7) of any unjust 
enrichment by the person who received such unjust enrichment as a result of such violation.”115 
Given this vague incorporation of authority, and especially given the use of an explicit reference 
to “unjust enrichment,” it is unclear how this law materially changes the tying of disgorgement to 
a general evocation of traditional equity set forth in Liu.116 It also is unclear if courts will 
consider this Congressional action in applying Liu to the other federal enforcers relying on 
disgorgement. Perhaps the only certainty is that SEC enforcement actions face a future of 
litigation to resolve these questions.  
 
In the DFA, Congress gave the CFTC and the CFPB a parallel form of express disgorgement 
authority. In practice, this has yet to change the law of disgorgement. The CFTC express 
disgorgement authority was placed in the DFA, which was enacted in 2010, even though the 
CFTC previously had been obtaining disgorgement under its statutory injunctive authority. The 
DFA provided the CFTC with statutory authority to obtain “disgorgement of gains received in 
connection with such violation.”117 A part of the DFA creation of the CFPB was a list of 
remedial authority that includes the right to obtain “disgorgement or compensation for unjust 
enrichment.”118 A few state statutes also expressly provide for the state attorney general to obtain 
disgorgement.119  
 
These grants of express statutory authority to the CFTC and the CFPB for disgorgement have not 
led to changes in judicial approaches to disgorgement. Courts in CFTC cases have either ignored 
the express statute authority for disgorgement in favor of the well-used statutory injunctive 
 
113 Id. at 203, 226 
114 Thomas Krysa & Peter Fetzer, Congress Passes NDAA Legislation Extending SEC’s Disgorgement Powers, THE 
NATIONAL LAW REVIEW (Jan. 11, 2021), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/congress-passes-ndaa-legislation-
extending-sec-s-disgorgement-powers?amp; see also H.R. 6395, 116th Cong., 166 CONG. REC. § 6501 (2020). 
115 Id. 
116 The amendment expressly overturned the limitations period on SEC disgorgement in Kokesh. Id. at §6501. 
117 7 U.S.C. § 13(1)-1(d)(3)(B). 
118 12 U.S.C. § 5565(a)(2)(D). The CFPB has generally only characterized an enforcement action remedy as 
disgorgement when exercising its discretion to remit collected funds to the federal treasury. See, e.g., In re Taylor, 
CFPB No. 2013-CFPB-0001 at ¶ 29 (May 17, 2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/291305_cfpb_consent-
order-0001.pdf. But the plain language of the DFA includes no explicit requirement that the Bureau direct disgorged 
funds to the federal treasury instead of consumers. 12 U.S.C. § 5565. Presumably the Bureau would be within its 
discretion to award disgorged funds to consumers affected by the defendant’s illegal act. 
119 See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44-1528. 
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authority,120 or have cited the express statute as a recognition but treated it as simply a 
Congressional recognition of the statutory injunctive authority and use case law from prior to the 
enactment of the DFA to shape the terms of the award.121 The CFPB has not explicitly relied on 
this express disgorgement authority for public compensation.122 Whether the restrictions imposed 
on disgorgement in Liu drive the CFTC or CFPB to seek an interpretation of their express 
disgorgement authority as broader than the limits of traditional equity is an open question.  
 
The SEC has since 2002 had parallel express authority of a wholly different sort, which allows it 
to add to disgorgement awards. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, enacted in the wake of the Enron 
scandal, created a unique authority for the SEC, known as Fair Funds, to use civil penalty money 
for public compensation.123 The SEC obtained over $8.28 billion in Fair Funds disgorgement in 
the first eleven years of using this authority, which is more than the $6.19 billion it was awarded 
in direct disgorgement based on its statutory injunctive authority.124 The unique feature of Fair 
Funds—allowing the SEC to use civil penalty recoveries as disgorgement in a given case—could 
provide the SEC an incentive to respond to limits imposed by Liu by shifting the recovery to a 
penalty amount in appropriate cases; again, subject to the recent amendment of the SEC’s 
remedial statute. In a recent case, for instance, the SEC withdrew a request for disgorgement in a 
pending enforcement action in favor of relying on a possible civil penalty award, and cited the 
impact of Liu in its request to make this change in preferred remedy.125 
 
 D.  Statutory Express Compensation Authority and Public Restitution 
  
Public enforcers rely on express authorization to obtain public compensation based on consumer 
loss, or public restitution. Subpart 1 reviews this express statutory authority for the FTC, CFTC 
and CFPB. Subpart 2 describes public restitution in state attorneys general enforcement actions. 
Unlike their federal counterparts, state attorneys general rely more on public restitution rather 
than disgorgement.  
 
  1. Federal Enforcers with Restitution Authority  
 
Section 19 of the FTC Act authorizes courts in FTC cases to issue an order “necessary to redress 
injury to consumers,” and “[s]uch relief may include… rescission or reformation of contracts, the 
refund of money or return of property, the payment of damages, and public notification 
 
120 See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Arrington, 998 F. Supp. 2d 847, 874 (D. Neb. 2014), aff'd sub 
nom. U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Kratville, 796 F.3d 873 (8th Cir. 2015); U.S. Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm'n v. 4X Sols., Inc., No. 13CV2287-RMB-FM, 2015 WL 9943241, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 
2015), report and recommendation adopted, No. 13CIV2287RMBFM, 2016 WL 397672 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2016).  
121 See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Amerman, 645 F. App'x 938, 943-944 (11th Cir. 2016); 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Dupont, No. 8:16-CV-03258-TMC, 2018 WL 3148532, at *12 (D.S.C. June 
22, 2018). 
122 See infra Part II.D.1. 
123 15 U.S.C.A. § 7246. Barbara Black, Should the SEC Be a Collection Agency for Defrauded Investors?, 63 Bus. 
Law. 317, 320-22 (2008) (tracing history of Fair Funds). Fair Funds were initially limited to additional amounts 
added to disgorgement already ordered by the court, but in reacting to another financial scandal in the DFA, 
Congress extended the SEC’s authority to use Fair Funds even when no direct disgorgement had been ordered.  
124 Velikonja, Public Compensation for Private Harm: Evidence from the SEC’s Fair Fund Distributions, supra note 
8 at 351 (2015). 
125 SEC v. Govender, No. 1:18-CV-7685 (ALC), 2020 WL 5758997, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2020). 
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respecting the rule violation or the unfair or deceptive act or practice.”126 Unlike its 
disgorgement authority under section 13 of the FTC Act, the agency can obtain this relief only in 
limited circumstances. Restitution is available only if the defendant is found to have violated 
FTC rules, or in a judicial proceeding following FTC issuance of an administrative cease and 
desist order resulting from conduct “which a reasonable man would have known under the 
circumstances was dishonest or fraudulent.”127 The FTC rarely employs this authority, instead 
relying almost exclusively on its statutory injunctive authority to seek disgorgement.128 It is 
unclear whether this disuse of section 19 by the FTC is the result of the restricted conditions on 
its application, or the relative ease of using its disgorgement authority. 
 
The CFTC’s express authority in the DFA authorizes it to obtain “equitable remedies  including- 
(A) restitution to persons who have sustained losses proximately caused by such violation (in the 
amount of such losses).”129 Unlike the FTC, the CFTC regularly employs this authority.130 
Courts have reaffirmed that the restitution authority in this statute provides for full recovery of 
investor losses, rejecting arguments that the use of the “equitable relief” prefatory language 
limits the CFTC to something less.131  
Unlike other federal enforcers, the CFPB nominally relies only on its express statutory authority 
for restitution. Because it is the new agency among federal market protection enforcers, 
Congress drew from existing statutes and law in providing the CFPB with comprehensive 
express authority for relief. The CFPB authorizing statute allows courts to “grant any appropriate 
legal or equitable relief,” including five specific items that could be categorized as public 
restitution.132 The specific list repeats almost verbatim the four items noted above from section 
19 of the FTC Act, plus adds the naked word “restitution.”133 Courts have employed the statute 
in a way that mixes the boundaries between disgorgement and restitution, predominantly 
referring to the award as “restitution,” but interchangeably citing to FTC and SEC disgorgement 
case law, and FTC public restitution cases.134 Thus, while the CFPB obtains public compensation 
 
126 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b). 
127 15 U.S.C. § 57b(a) (parenthetical in statute). 
128 See Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Commissioner of the Fed. Trade Comm’n, Dollars, Doctrines, and Damage Control: 
How Disgorgement Affects the FTC’s Antitrust Mission, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FED. TRADE COMM’N at 4 
(Apr. 20, 2016). 
129 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1(d)(3)(A). 
130  United States Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Brown, No. 3:15-CV-354-J-39MCR, 2018 WL 6920384, 
at *3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 12, 2018) (listing cases in which CFTC uses restitution authority) 
131  Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. JBW Capital, 812 F.3d 98, 111 (1st Cir. 2016); U.S. Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm'n v. Reisinger, No. 11-CV-08567, 2017 WL 4164197, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 19, 2017), on 
reconsideration in part, No. 11 CV 08567, 2019 WL 4464387 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2019); U.S. Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm'n v. U.S. Bank, N.A., No. 13-CV-2041-LRR, 2014 WL 6474183, at *36 (N.D. Iowa Nov. 19, 2014). 
See also Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Miklovich, 687 F. App'x 449, 453 (6th Cir. 2017) (concurring that 
consumer loss is the measure of restitution, but holding that defendant waived argument). 
132 12 U.S.C. § 5565(a)(1). 
133 12 U.S.C. § 5565. The other two items on this list are civil penalties and a descriptive of injunctive authority 
(“limits on the activities or functions of the person”). Id. at (G) and (H). 
134 See, e.g., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Gordon, 819 F.3d 1179, 1195 (9th Cir. 2016) (restitution, citing 
primarily SEC and FTC disgorgement cases); Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Mortg. Law Grp., LLP, 420 F. Supp. 
3d 848, 853 (W.D. Wis. 2019) (restitution, citing SEC and FTC disgorgement cases, and other CFPB cases). See 
also Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Nationwide Biweekly Admin., Inc., No. 15-CV-02106-RS, 2017 WL 3948396, 
at *12 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2017) (restitution denied; primarily citing FTC public restitution case); Consumer Fin. 
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based on express statutory authority, in practice it seeks relief that is not clearly governed by 
either a theory of disgorgement or public restitution. 
 
  2. State Enforcers 
 
Most state attorneys general have express statutory authority for public compensation.135 Unlike 
federal public compensation law, state law is dominated by measuring relief in terms of 
consumer loss.136 Although state public enforcement cases occasionally refer to disgorgement or 
cite to Porter, some state courts have rejected the use of disgorgement when not expressly 
authorized by statute or when state law provides for restitution or another express remedy.137 
 
A common form of state statute providing for public restitution awards to the state attorney 
general is for a court order to “restore to any person in interest any moneys or property, real or 
personal which may have been acquired by means of any practice herein declared to be 
unlawful,” or the like.138 Other state statutes refer specifically to an award of restitution.139 Some 
states include a requirement that the consumer loss be “ascertainable.”140 Colorado allows for 
public restitution orders “to completely compensate or restore to the original position of any 
person injured” by a violation.141 Although statutes authorizing state attorneys general to obtain 
restitution are even more varied than federal law, it is not clear that differences in statutory 
language substantially drives state court interpretations of the requisites for this relief. State 
courts typically use the term restitution and the concept of consumer loss as a measure of relief 
regardless of the nomenclature in the underlying statutory authority. 
 
State enforcers also can rely on federal law to obtain public compensation. Twenty-four federal 
statutes authorize state attorneys general, and sometimes state financial regulators, to enforce 
federal consumer protection laws.142 Many of these statutes provide express authority for public 




Prot. Bureau v. CashCall, Inc., No. CV1507522JFWRAOX, 2018 WL 485963, at *14 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2018) 
(same). 
135 NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES § 13.5.4.1, Appx A. 
136 Id. at § 13.5.4.1 (concluding that “[t]he purpose of restitution is to restore the victim, not the offender, to the 
status quo” in state attorneys general enforcement of UDAP laws). People v. Sarpas, 172 Cal. Rptr. 3d 25, 44 (App. 
Ct. 2014). 
137 See State ex rel. Horne v. Autozone, Inc., 275 P.3d 1278 (Ariz. 2012); State ex rel. Miller v. Santa Rosa Sales & 
Mktg., Inc., 475 N.W.2d 210 (Iowa 1991). Even when authorizing public compensation under general equitable 
authority, states typically refer to it as restitution. NCLC UDAP 13.5.4.1 n360 (collecting cases).  
138 N.J. Stat. § 56:8-8. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-1528; Iowa Code § 714.16; Wash. Rev. Code § 19.86.080. 
139 See, e.g., CT AG General Statutes § 42–110m(a); 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 505/7; Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 
13-403. 
140 See, e.g., Tenn. Code § 47-18-108; Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 5, § 209. 
141 COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-110. 
142 Amy Widman, Prentiss Cox, State Attorneys General's Use of Concurrent Public Enforcement Authority in 
Federal Consumer Protection Laws, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 53, 56-57 (2011). 
143 Prentiss Cox, Public Enforcement Compensation and Private Rights, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2313, 2328 (2016). 
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III. PUBLIC COMPENSATION DOCTRINE 
 
Public compensation effectively has its own unrecognized legal doctrine rooted in the rationales 
of public enforcement. We have seen that courts and Congress (or state legislatures) have 
sketched the outlines of such a doctrine by shaping two distinct categories of public 
compensation-- disgorgement and restitution. In this Part, we integrate decades of judicial 
decisions across the various federal and state public enforcement schemes into a more coherent 
expression of existing doctrine. In doing so, we emphasize points of commonality in judicial 
decisions. We extend this consensus with a proposed test to resolve difficult public restitution 
cases involving variation in conduct or partial benefit to victims of illegal activity. A key feature 
of the doctrine we describe is that it is designed solely as a remedy in public enforcement.  
 
Subpart A states the scope of our proposed doctrine and notes public enforcement remedies 
outside of our concern here. Subpart B identifies a core interpretative principle common to both 
disgorgement and restitution, which is a causation presumption that allows the court to measure 
public compensation by a reasonable approximation and burden-shifting framework. Subparts C 
and D elaborate the parts of the doctrine specific to disgorgement and restitution, respectively. In 
subpart E, we provide examples of how the doctrine would be applied. This subpart looks at 
situations in which disgorgement would apply but not restitution, and vice versa, and provides 
examples of when public enforcers have incentives to use one theory versus the other based on 
likely results and difficulty of proof.  
 
 A. Defining Public Compensation  
 
Public compensation, as that term is employed here, has three attributes: (1) an award of money 
to people, (2) resulting from a government entity enforcing a civil market protection law, and (3) 
involving a substantial number of people awarded compensation. We describe each of these 
criteria below.144 
 
Money to People, Not Governments. Public enforcement can result in non-monetary relief that 
directly benefits people. For instance, federal environmental suits have provided for clean-up 
projects that benefit residents of a particular locale.145 We focus our discussion here on the award 
of money to people because the overwhelming majority of public compensation is the 
distribution of money, and the award of non-monetary relief can raise a different set of issues as 
to measurement and distribution of the relief. We also are concerned only with money awards 
distributed to people affected by a violation, and not money obtained in enforcement actions 
retained by the government or dedicated to another use. Thus, civil penalty awards not re-
directed to people impacted by a law violation are not within the scope of this doctrine. We also 
do not include as public compensation an award of money to governments for pecuniary harm 
resulting from public civil enforcement of market protection laws, such as the tobacco cases 
 
144 We also limit our analysis to the award of public compensation by the courts. Some enforcers have authority to 
direct public compensation be paid through administrative proceedings. 
145 Seema Kakade, Remedial Payments in Agency Enforcement, 44 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 117 (2020); see also State 
ex rel. Guste v. Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc., 528 So. 2d 198 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1988) (ordering seller to honor 
long-term contracts). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3809786
25 
 
brought by state attorneys general in the 1990s alleging UDAP and antitrust violations that 
resulted in payments to the states.146  
 
Government Enforcement of Civil Market Protection Laws. Public compensation concerns civil 
actions brought by public enforcers for violations of market protection laws. Not within the type 
of public compensation of concern here are government awards of money to people through the 
administration of compensation programs, such as the 9/11 fund, oil spill funds or the like.147 
Criminal prosecutions can result in restitution awards that are not within the scope of our 
article.148 
 
Substantial Number of People. Finally, the public compensation doctrine proposed here is 
concerned with awards of money to large numbers of people in a public enforcement action. 
Some public enforcers regularly obtain relief for individuals or small groups. The CFPB and 
state attorneys general mediate consumer disputes that often results in return of money to 
individual complainants.149 State attorneys general bring enforcement actions that obtain 
compensation for a single individual or a small group of people with identifiable dollar amounts 
of loss, as does the EEOC.150 State governments also operate professional malpractice 
compensation funds, or issue awards in such cases, to specific individuals harmed by such 
misconduct.151  Return of money to specific individuals or small groups in these circumstances 
do not raise serious doctrinal concerns. The difficult questions with public compensation arise 
from the complexities of determining how much public compensation should issue in the face of 
conduct affecting mass numbers of people, especially when there exist dissimilarities in conduct 
as to, or experience within, that population.  
 
  B. Reasonable Approximation Framework 
 
Although disgorgement and restitution are based on different measures—ill-gotten gain versus 
consumer loss—they present common problems of the proof required for causation and 
determining the proper amount of public compensation. Courts have developed a consensus 
position to address these problems. Causation is presumed on proof of the law violation if the 
public enforcer can present a reasonable approximation of ill-gotten gain (disgorgement) or 
consumer loss (restitution). If the enforcer meets this requisite, the burden shifts to the law 
violator to prove the amount was not a reasonable approximation.  
  
 
146 Howard M. Erichson, Coattail Class Actions: Reflections on Microsoft, Tobacco, and the Mixing of Public and 
Private Lawyering in Mass Litigation, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 30-35 (2000); PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 
56 at § 7:13 (describing public enforcement actions against pharmaceutical companies and nursing home alleging 
UDAP violations resulting in payments to government). 
147 Michael D. Sant'Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, The Agency Class Action, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1992, 1996 
(2012). 
148 CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34138, RESTITUTION IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES (2019).  
149 Angela Littwin, Why Process Complaints? Then and Now, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 895 (2015) 
150 Cox, et al., supra note 5 at 39 (as to state attorneys general); Morrison, supra note 31 at 121. 
151 See, e.g., Wisconsin’s Injured Patients and Families Compensation Fund, Insurance J. (2017). 
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  1. Disgorgement  
 
This reasonable approximation framework was first articulated by the D.C. Circuit in S.E.C. v. 
First City Fin. Corp. in 1989.152 The defendants in First City violated federal securities law by 
failing to timely disclose their purchase of more than 5% of Ashland Oil as part of a hostile 
takeover attempt, which allowed them to continue to accumulate stock in the company at a lower 
cost than would have been the case if the takeover was revealed by proper disclosure. After 
citing to Porter and Texas Gulf Sulphur in brushing aside a challenge to the validity of 
disgorgement, the court tackled the issue of determining the amount of the ill-gotten gain, and 
thus the amount of public compensation under disgorgement law. The district court had ordered 
$2.7 million in disgorgement by calculating the profit defendants received on stock purchased 
after the disclosure that was subsequently repurchased by Ashland Oil at a higher price after 
discovery of the takeover attempt. 
 
In affirming this disgorgement award, the D.C. Circuit started with the public purpose rationale 
of disgorgement, observing that “[t]he remedy may well be a key to the SEC's efforts to deter 
others from violating the securities laws,” but also noted the causation problem presented by the 
principle of equity that relief must not be punitive, and thus “the SEC generally must distinguish 
between legally and illegally obtained profits.” Defendants argued that the measure of full profits 
ordered by the district court was “simplistic, quite unrealistic,” and offered expert testimony 
suggesting causes for the rise in stock price unrelated to the violation of failing to disclose its 
purchases. The D.C. Circuit saw the problem as one of decision-making in a context of 
“imprecision and imperfect information,” which meant that “[r]ules for calculating disgorgement 
must recognize that separating legal from illegal profits exactly may at times be a near-
impossible task.” The court resolved this problem by stating the reasonable approximation 
framework for evaluating causation between the violation and the measure of ill-gotten gains: 
 
Although the SEC bears the ultimate burden of persuasion that its disgorgement figure 
reasonably approximates the amount of unjust enrichment, we believe the government's 
showing of appellants' actual profits on the tainted transactions at least presumptively 
satisfied that burden. Appellants, to whom the burden of going forward shifted, were then 
obliged clearly to demonstrate that the disgorgement figure was not a reasonable 
approximation… 
 
The court emphasized that “the risk of uncertainty should fall on the wrongdoer whose illegal 
conduct created that uncertainty.”153 
 
The reasonable approximation framework enunciated in First City has developed into a 
consensus position for establishing the amount of disgorgement in SEC cases.154 It has been 
adopted for SEC enforcement by courts in nine circuits and has not been rejected by any 
 
152 890 F.2d 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
153 Id. at 1232 
154 Russell G. Ryan, The Equity Façade of SEC Disgorgement, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 11 (2013) (“the 
SEC is required to proffer only a “reasonable approximation” of the alleged ill-gotten gains, at which point the 
evidentiary burden shifts to the defendant to disprove the SEC’s calculation.”).  
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circuit.155 The Second Circuit has stated this framework relieves the SEC of the burden of 
establishing its approximation “with exactitude.”156 In adopting reasonable approximation, the 
Third Circuit also held that the burden-shifting element of this framework applied to a law 
violator’s claim of intervening causes, holding that “intervening causation is not an element of 
the SEC's evidentiary burden in setting out an amount to be disgorged that reasonably 
approximates illegal profits,” but rather is an issue that will normally be the defendant's 
burden.”157 
 
Circuit courts also have broadly adopted, and without split, the use of reasonable approximation 
with burden-shifting in FTC cases seeking disgorgement.158 Reasonable approximation has been 
used by courts determining public compensation in enforcement actions brought by all of the 
other federal public enforcers regularly obtaining this relief, including the CFPB, HUD and 
CFTC.159 Courts have cited across market protection schemes in using reasonable approximation 
to measure disgorgement.160  
 
  2. Public Restitution  
 
The reasonable approximation framework also applies in public restitution cases. In the oft-cited 
Ninth Circuit case on public restitution under section 19 of the FTC Act, FTC v. Figgie Int’l, the 
defendant deceptively sold heat detectors.161 The court rejected defendant’s argument that 
restitution should be limited to consumers who proved that they relied on the deceptive 
statements. As did the D.C. Circuit in First City, the court began by distinguishing private fraud 
action based on their higher proof burdens and lack of public purpose that animated FTC public 
compensation, noting that requiring such proof would thwart effective civil law enforcement. It 
held that “[a] presumption of actual reliance arises once the Commission has proved that the 
 
155 Seven circuit court of appeals have adopted this framework. SEC v. Happ, 392 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2004); SEC v. 
Contorinis, 743 F.3d 296, 305 (2d Cir. 2014); SEC v. Teo, 746 F.3d 90, 105–06 (3d Cir. 2014); Bear Ranch, L.L.C. 
v. Heartbrand Beef, Inc., 885 F.3d 794, 805 (5th Cir. 2018); SEC v. Platforms Wireless Int'l Corp., 617 F.3d 1072 
(9th Cir. 2010); SEC v. Curshen, 372 F. App'x 872, 883 (10th Cir. 2010); SEC v. Calvo, 378 F.3d 1211, 1217 (11th 
Cir. 2004). The reasonable approximation framework also has been used by district courts in the Sixth and Eighth 
Circuits. United States SEC v. Kilpatrick, No. 12-12109, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104307 (E.D. Mich. July 31, 
2014); United States SEC v. Quan, No. 11-723 ADM/JSM, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131618 (D. Minn. Sep. 19, 
2014). 
156 SEC v. Razmilovic, 738 F.3d 14, 31 (2d Cir. 2013), as amended (Nov. 26, 2013). 
157 Teo, 746 F.3d at 105–06 (3d Cir. 2014).  
158 F.T.C. v. Direct Mktg. Concepts, Inc., 624 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2010); F.T.C. v. BlueHippo Funding, LLC, 762 
F.3d 238 (2d Cir. 2014); F.T.C. v. Febre, 128 F.3d 530, 535 (7th Cir. 1997);  F.T.C. v. Kuykendall, 371 F.3d 745 
(10th Cir. 2004); see also F.T.C. v. Sec. Rare Coin & Bullion Corp., 931 F.2d 1312, 1316 (8th Cir. 1991) (“To 
satisfy the reliance requirement in actions brought under section 13(b) of the Act, the FTC need merely show that 
the misrepresentations or omissions were of a kind usually relied upon by reasonable and prudent persons, that they 
were widely disseminated, and that the injured consumers actually purchased the defendants' products.”). 
159 Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Gordon, 819 F.3d 1179, 1195 (9th Cir. 2016); U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. 
v. Cost Control Mktg. & Sales Mgmt. of Virginia, Inc., 64 F.3d 920, 927 (4th Cir. 1995) (“First City and the district 
court set a practical standard for the government's initial burden of coming forward.”); U.S. Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm'n v. Am. Bullion Exch. Abex, Corp., No. SACV101876DOCRNBX, 2014 WL 12603558, at *9 
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2014); see also Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Am. Metals Exch. Corp., 991 F.2d 71, 
78 (3d Cir. 1993) (permitting “reasonable approximation” of violator gain on remand). 
160 See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Febre, 128 F.3d 530, 535 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing SEC, HUD and CFTC cases). 
161 F.T.C. v. Figgie Int’l, Inc., 994 F.2d 595, 605 (9th Cir. 1993). 
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defendant made material misrepresentations, that they were widely disseminated, and that 
consumers purchased the defendant's product.”162 The Ninth Circuit then adopted the reasonable 
approximation framework with burden-shifting from disgorgement cases for determining the 
proper amount of public restitution, finding that the “same reasoning is applicable to Section 19,” 
and holding that “[b]ecause Figgie has presented no evidence to rebut the presumption of 
reliance, injury to consumers has been established.”163 
 
Courts awarding restitution to state attorneys general have relied on the reasonable 
approximation framework or similar principles. Precision in determining the amount of a 
restitution award is not required.164 A New York appellate court, for example, upheld a 
restitution award and rejected defendant General Electric’s argument about the value of the 
service, stating “GE, whose deceptive practices caused damages to so many consumers, can now 
hardly complain that petitioner has not quantified actual damages with exactitude.”165 State cases 
awarding public compensation also have overwhelmingly rejected the argument that state 
attorneys general must show consumer reliance and that consumers must testify to be awarded 
public compensation.166 As with disgorgement, fundamental differences between public 
compensation and private relief underlie these relaxed proof standards.167 
 
The causation presumption in the reasonable approximation framework obviates the need for the 
public enforcer to present evidence of individual reliance to obtain public restitution. Defendants 
in public enforcement cases often argue that a prerequisite of public compensation is that each 
consumer testify as to their reliance on the conduct underlying the violation, and courts routinely 
reject this argument.168 To hold otherwise would make public compensation impossible to award 
in most cases. 
  
 
162 Id. at 605 (quoting FTC v. Kitco of Nevada, Inc., 612 F.Supp. 1282 (D. Minn. 1985). 
163 Id. at 605-606. 
164 State v. Bob Chambers Ford, Inc., 522 A.2d 362, 366 (Me. 1987) (“fair market value may be established by 
approximation as long as the fact finder can reach a specific conclusion.”); State ex rel. Slatery v. HRC Med. 
Centers, Inc., 603 S.W.3d 1, 30 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2019), appeal denied (Apr. 16, 2020) (rejecting that attorney general 
must show “mathematically precise computation of reasonably identifiable alleged direct losses incurred by 
consumers”). 
165  People ex rel. Spitzer v. Gen. Elec. Co., 302 A.D.2d 314, 317, 756 N.Y.S.2d 520, 525 (20). 
166 Infra Part III.D.1. 
167 Kugler v. Romain, 279 A.2d 640, 649 (N.J. 1971) (“If the only available route has been pursuit of a private 
remedy by individual victims of the unfair practices, … such a rule would require an unrealistic expenditure of 
judicial energy.”). See also State v. Bob Chambers Ford, Inc., 522 A.2d 362, 367 (Me. 1987) (“[t]he UTPA, by 
providing for actions by the Attorney General, seeks to provide an efficient, inexpensive and broad solution to the 
alleged wrong.”); Consumer Prot. Div. Office of Atty. Gen. v. Consumer Pub. Co., 501 A.2d 48, 74 (Md. 1985) 
(describing case law in which state courts have held that proof requirements for restitution are relaxed in public 
enforcement cases). 
168 Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. McDonnell, 332 F. Supp. 3d 641, 726 (E.D.N.Y. 2018); U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Hunter Wise Commodities, LLC, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1317, 1352 (S.D. Fla. 
2014); State v. Minnesota Sch. Of Bus., Inc., 935 N.W.2d 124, 135-138 (Minn. 2019); State ex rel. Kidwell v. 
Master Distributors, Inc., 101 Idaho 447, 456, 615 P.2d 116, 125 (1980); State v. Ralph Williams' N. W. Chrysler 
Plymouth, Inc., 87 Wash. 2d 298, 321, 553 P.2d 423, 439 (1976); State ex rel. Webster v. Areaco Inv. Co., 756 
S.W.2d 633, 637 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988). But see People v. Shifrin, 342 P.3d 506, 520 (Colo. Ct. Appeals 2014) 
(rejecting public compensation to non-testifying consumers because restitution was sought for only 37 consumers, 
they were locally available witnesses, and the amount sought by the attorney general --more than $3 million- was 
substantial). 
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 C. Particular Principles of Disgorgement 
 
Unlike adjudication of a private right to unjust enrichment, which is premised on the relationship 
between the litigants, disgorgement in public enforcement is based on the deterrence of conduct 
of the violator, and thus should be available in any public enforcement action in which the 
enforcer can approximate the violator’s monetary gain. The bar here is low. Almost all public 
protection civil law violations occur when a business seeks to gain an illegal market advantage. 
Wage theft allows the business to obtain labor without paying the cost of full compliance with 
wage laws. Deceiving investors as to the business fundamentals adds to the stock issuer’s capital 
an amount that would not have been gained at the same stock price if the businesses’ 
performance was properly disclosed.  
 
Subpart 1 details widely-held principles for measuring the amount of a disgorgement award that 
are consistent with the Court’s holdings in Liu. Subpart 2 looks at areas of discord in the law, or 
where Liu shifts or clarifies the law. 
 
  1. Agreed Principles for Measuring the Amount of Disgorgement 
 
Several principles for measuring violator gain are clear. Courts do not require tracing of the 
precise money improperly gained by the defendant.169 Similarly, it is well-settled that the lack of 
clear records from a law violator are not needed to establish the amount of improper gain.170 
These results flow partly from the burden-shifting process in the reasonable approximation 
framework. Courts typically permit revenue to the law violator to be used as a proxy for profits 
in the initial stage of the enforcer’s duty to reasonably approximate loss. The burden falls on the 
law violator to disprove this approximation, and its own failure to maintain adequate records is 
not an excuse for failing to produce proof to meet its burden during this second stage of the 
process.  
 
Money refunded to consumers is excluded in calculating the amount of disgorgement.171 This is 
true whether or not revenue is used as a proxy for profit or the enforcer introduces direct 
evidence of the amount of profit. If the law violator returns money to the people subject to the 
violation it cannot have profited in that amount. If known to the enforcer, these amounts should 
be excluded at the initial stage of enforcer approximation of gain.172 
 
Money paid by the consumer but not received by the law violator also can be excluded when 
determining disgorgement. In F.T.C. v. Verity Int'l, Ltd, the Second Circuit distinguished 
between two similar schemes for collecting money billed to phone carriers as international 
calls.173 In one scheme, the phone service companies took a share of the revenue paid by the 
 
169 SEC v. Faulkner, No. 3:16-CV-1735-D, 2021 WL 75551, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2021) (citing FTC and SEC 
case law rejecting tracing requirement). 
170 F.T.C. v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 654 F.3d 359, 374 (2d Cir. 2011) (“it is unsurprising that Bronson can point to 
no case in which a public agency seeking to obtain equitable monetary relief has been required to satisfy the tracing 
rules.”); SEC v. Quan, 817 F.3d 583, 594 (8th Cir. 2016). 
171 See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Primary Grp., Inc., 713 F. App'x 805 (11th Cir. 2017); SEC v. Tropikgadget 
FZE, 146 F. Supp. 3d 270 (D. Mass. 2015).  
172 Verity Winship, Disgorgement in Insider Trading Cases: FY 2005- FY 2015, 71 SMU L. REV. 999, 1004 (2018). 
173  F.T.C. v. Verity Int'l, Ltd., 443 F.3d 48, 67-68 (2d Cir. 2006). 
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consumer and the violators were paid the remainder. In the second scheme, the “payment 
structure flowed differently,” with all revenue going to the violators, who then paid the service 
providers. The Second Circuit held that disgorgement should be measured by the amount of 
money received by the violators, so that the amounts retained by the service providers in the first 
scheme were excluded from the disgorgement award and the amounts paid to the service 
providers in the second scheme were not deducted from disgorgement.  
 
  2. Reshaping and Unsettling of the Law by Liu 
 
The Court’s decision in Liu resolves at least one area of discord in the law, and unsettles the law 
in other ways. Before Liu, a substantial body of case law held that disgorgement could be 
measured by consumer loss rather than the violator’s gain. In F.T.C. v. Febre, for instance, the 
Seventh Circuit affirmed an award of over $16 million in public compensation to the FTC under 
its section 13 statutory injunctive authority, and hence in disgorgement, based solely on 
consumer loss.174 Defendants had argued that no disgorgement was proper because there was 
“conflicting testimony whether documents existed which would allow the calculation of profits.” 
The court rejected this argument because “these documents would have no impact upon the 
calculation of damages” for the reason that “profits were not taken into consideration” as the 
district court relied solely on a consumer loss measure.175 The consumer loss measure of 
disgorgement has been used in other FTC section 13 cases, but has been rejected by some 
courts.176 Measuring disgorgement by loss also has occurred in securities public enforcement 
case law.177  
 
Liu forecloses this approach to measuring disgorgement, unequivocally stating that ill-gotten net 
profits is the only measure of disgorgement. This holding is consistent with the essential 
distinction between disgorgement and public restitution in decades of the most carefully 
reasoned decisions. Accordingly, it is unlikely to be disturbed by the NDAA amendments adding 
express disgorgement authority to SEC remedial powers. 
 
Violators often contend that their expenses should be excluded when measuring profits to be 
disgorged. Courts routinely reject these arguments, holding that such expenses are not 
deductible, and that the measure of disgorgement is “net revenue (gross receipts minus refunds), 
 
174 F.T.C. v. Febre, 128 F.3d 530, 536 (7th Cir. 1997). 
175 Id. at 536. The court in Febre could have reached the same result by following the well-established principles of 
using revenue as a reasonable approximation of gain, shifting the burden to defendants to document profits were 
lower than revenue, and then denying resort to poor record-keeping as a basis for disproving the FTC’s reasonable 
estimate. 
176 F.T.C. v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d 924, 931 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Equity may require a defendant to restore his victims to 
the status quo where the loss suffered is greater than the defendant's unjust enrichment.”);  
F.T.C. v. Sec. Rare Coin & Bullion Corp., 931 F.2d 1312, 1316 (8th Cir. 1991) (awarding loss where the amount 
exceeds violator gain is proper in disgorgement). Compare F.T.C. v. Verity Int'l, Ltd., 443 F.3d 48, 67 (2d Cir. 
2006) (holding it was error to measure disgorgement by consumer loss); F.T.C. v. Washington Data Res., Inc., 704 
F.3d 1323, 1326 (11th Cir. 2013) (“a damages award based on consumer losses would be improper” when FTC 
sought disgorgement.). 
177 See, e.g., SEC: SEC v. Lorin, 76 F.3d 458 (2d Cir. 1996). CFTC: U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. 
PMC Strategy, LLC, 903 F.Supp. 2d 368, 382 (W.D.N.C. 2012) (ordering public compensation based on amount of 
investor loss when using statutory injunctive authority and disgorgement theory); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm'n v. Crombie, 914 F.3d 1208, 1216 (9th Cir. 2019) (proper to award disgorgement based on consumer loss). 
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rather than the amount of profit (net revenue minus expenses).”178 Liu makes this broad 
proposition untenable and introduces uncertainty as to when expenditures by violators can be 
used to reduce a disgorgement award. 
 
Liu also should constrain disgorgement awarded based on joint and several liability principles. 
The Court noted three SEC enforcement actions in which the court awarded disgorgement on a 
joint liability theory in a “manner sometimes seemingly at odds with the common-law rule 
requiring individual liability for wrongful profits.”179 As with the deduction of expenses, the 
Court’s opinion opens the opportunity for years of litigation to find the contours of this limit. For 
example, one of the questioned cases, S.E.C. v. Whittemore, was a D.C. Circuit opinion in a 
“pump and dump” stock price scheme.180 One of the defendants, Cahill, held jointly and 
severally liable for the disgorgement award argued doing so was improper because the SEC 
failed to establish both his collaboration with the primary defendants and his close relationship 
with the primary defendants. The court held that close collaboration was enough, and then 
applied the reasonable approximation framework in holding: “Once the Commission established 
the close collaboration between Cahill and the Whittemore defendants in the fraudulent scheme, 
the burden was on Cahill to establish that apportionment was warranted...and Cahill failed to do 
so.”181 It is unclear exactly which part of the D.C. Circuit’s analysis was of concern to the Court 
in Liu.  Nor is it clear what the Court’s expressed displeasure with SEC case law on joint and 
several liability means for the common practice of finding “relief defendants” liable for 
disgorgement.182 
 
  3. To Whom a Disgorgement Award Should be Distributed. 
 
Because it is a remedy based on depriving gain, not compensating loss, questions of distributing 
disgorged money should not demand precision. Distribution of the ill-acquired gain for any 
public benefit are in the broad discretion of the court, unless the statutory authority of the 
enforcer specifically restricts distribution in some way.183 In disgorgement, courts care less 
whether some victims receive a windfall, or conversely go uncompensated, because depriving 
wrong-doers of ill-gotten gains is proper when it blunts the incentive to compete through illegal 
activity, and receipt of public compensation does not preclude recovery in a private suit. 
 
Consistent with this purpose, it is almost always appropriate to allow enforcers to control the 
specifics of allocating money to consumers who were subject in some way to the illegal practice. 
The typical disgorgement order for both the FTC and the SEC is a fund to be distributed to 
 
178 F.T.C. v. Washington Data Res., Inc., 704 F.3d 1323, 1327 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing FTC cases from the First, 
Second and Seventh Circuits holding the same). 
179 Liu, at 1936. 
180 SEC v. Whittemore, 659 F.3d 1, 10-13 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
181 Id. at 11. 
182 Compare SEC v. Colello, 139 F.3d 674, 676 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding relief defendant liabile and holding that 
equity permits joint liability for “one who has received the proceeds after the wrong”), with Fed. Trade Comm'n v. 
LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158, 176-178 (2d Cir. 2016) (no liability where alleged relief defendant had 
legitimate claim to funds). 
183 SEC v. First Pac. Bancorp, 142 F.3d 1186, 1192 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Once the primary purpose of disgorgement has 
been served by depriving the wrongdoer of ill-gotten gains, the district court has broad discretion in determining the 
disposition of the disgorged funds.”) (citations omitted). 
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consumers at the sole discretion of the agency.184 Any distribution of the money that reasonably 
relates to the reason for disgorgement would be proper because this distribution is a method of 
ensuring the implementation of law rather than a compensation device. Absent a statutory 
restriction, it should be proper for enforcers to use disgorged money for purposes other than 
public compensation, such as for public education or to support future public enforcement. 
 
Placing the money in a public treasury also is reasonably related to a public purpose for 
disgorgement.185 As previously noted, the holding in Liu prohibiting the SEC from disgorging 
funds to the U. S. Treasury was based on particular language in the SEC statutory injunction 
provision.186 Even after Liu, it seems likely the long-approved SEC practice of disbursing to the 
Treasury money left-over in a disgorgement fund from inability to locate recipients would 
survive.187 
 
 D. Particular Principles of Public Restitution  
 
Public restitution is based on express statutory authority, and thus the restrictions imposed on 
disgorgement by the bounds of traditional equity do not constrain the use of this remedy absent 
specific statutory language to the contrary. Equitable limits on joint and several liability do not 
necessarily apply with public restitution. The problem of whether to consider money never 
received by the defendant in calculating the award, or to deduct the expenses of the violator from 
the award, also should have no application in deciding public restitution because it is based on 
consumer loss.188    
 
Conversely, the shift in focus from ill-gotten gain to consumer loss complicates determining the 
amount and distribution of the award compared to disgorgement. The broad outline of public 
restitution law is clear, but the case law in this area is less abundant and less coherent than 
judicial decisions on disgorgement. Subparts 1 and 2 identify the issues in a public restitution 
theory of public compensation, with particular attention to its application in situations when the 
loss is less readily discerned because of partial benefit to consumers from the transaction, 
variation in conduct of the violator, variation in the experience of consumers. Subpart 3 suggests 
a proportionality test to determine the amount of the award and the eligibility of particular people 
for the award in such difficult cases.  
 
  1. Complications in Determining Public Restitution 
 
The early FTC and state attorney general cases did not ask much from a legal doctrine of public 
restitution. Uniformly selling goods and services of no value should result in an order to provide 
full restitution to all consumers under any reasonable legal standard. The work of the public 
compensation doctrine, by contrast, arises in situations that complicate this narrative.  
 
184 Velikonja, Public Compensation for Private Harm: Evidence from the SEC’s Fair Fund Distributions, supra note 
8 at 343 (2015) (except in “rare cases,” the SEC “creates and oversees a distribution fund …(that) includes 
developing a plan to administer and distribute the funds and overseeing the distribution.”); Cox, et al., supra note 5 
at 73 (83% of FTC public compensation awards in 2014 distributed in the discretion of the agency). 
185 SEC v. Fischbach Corp., 133 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 1997). 
186 Supra Part II.C.3. 
187 See, e.g., SEC v. Blavin, 760 F.2d 706, 713 (6th Cir. 1985); F.T.C. v. Febre, 128 F.3d 530, 537 (7th Cir. 1997). 
188 Infra Part V.B.2. 




A common issue in determining the proper amount of restitution is accounting for any value 
received by the consumer resulting from the transaction in which the law violation occurred. 
This issue arose in Figgie, and the Seventh Circuit rejected the argument that a full refund is 
improper when a product has more than de minimis value to consumers.189 The court made the 
following analogy in support of this holding: 
 
Customers who purchased rhinestones sold as diamonds should have the opportunity to 
get all of their money back. We would not limit their recovery to the difference between 
what they paid and a fair price for rhinestones. The seller's misrepresentations tainted the 
customers' purchasing decisions…The fraud in the selling, not the value of the thing sold, 
is what entitles consumers in this case to full refunds or to refunds for each detector that 
is not useful to them.190 
Other courts have held similarly.191  
 
In Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Nationwide Biweekly Admin., Inc., the court noted that 
“[r]elatively little guidance exists as to how a court should exercise discretion” in cases involving 
conduct not found egregious. Despite acknowledging the holding in Figgie that some benefit to 
consumers does not obviate a full refund, the court denied any restitution where there may have 
been a benefit to consumers and they may have chosen to purchase the service even if fully-
informed.192 Rejecting any restitution in this circumstance makes Nationwide Biweekly an outlier 
decision, especially given the reasonable approximation framework, but other courts have 
expressed concern about how much restitution to award in situations of varying violator conduct 
or consumer experience.193  
 
A federal district court decision in a request by the FTC for public restitution under section 19 is 
an example of a difficult case for determining consumer loss. The court denied summary 
judgment to the FTC for public compensation, in part, because of variation in conduct. The 
defendant made false representations “in a variety of written and filmed sales materials, as well 
as in oral presentations at dinner parties that varied from instance to instance.”194 The consumer 
 
189 F.T.C. v. Figgie Int’l, Inc., 994 F.2d 595, 606 (9th Cir. 1993). 
190 Id. 
191 F.T.C. v. IAB Mktg. Assocs., LP, 746 F.3d 1228, 1235 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Figgie and holding that possible 
“residual value” not a defense to asset freeze because fraud tainted buying decision); People ex rel. Spitzer v. 
Applied Card Sys., Inc., 41 A.D.3d 4, 9, 834 N.Y.S.2d 558, 563 (2007), aff'd, 11 N.Y.3d 105, 894 N.E.2d 1 (2008) 
(citing Figgie and upholding restitution despite consumers receiving some value from credit card); State v. Cottman 
Transmissions Sys., Inc., 86 Md. App. 714, 736, 587 A.2d 1190, 1201 (1991) (“the proper standard here is not 
whether the customers received an inspection for their money; it is whether the merchant induced the consumers to 
pay for the inspections through deception…. to hold otherwise would make the restitution procedure meaningless in 
every case where something is provided, through deceptive practices, to those being deceived.”). 
192 Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Nationwide Biweekly Administration, Inc., No. 15-CV-02106-RS, 2017 WL 
3948396, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2017).  
193 See, e.g., Consumer Prot. Div. v. Morgan, 387 Md. 125, 874 A.2d 919 (2005); State of Colorado v. Center for 
Excellence in Higher Education, et. al., No. 14-CV-34530 (Denver Cty Dis. Ct. August 21, 2020)  (denying award of 
public restitution because some students obtained value from the for-profit college degree). 
194  F.T.C. v. AMREP Corp., 705 F. Supp. 119, 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
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experience also varied, as the record on summary judgment did not show which consumers were 
subject to which particular representations. The court contrasted this type of deception with a  
“false newspaper ad or prospectus (for which) each and every purchaser who responded to the ad 
or the prospectus would have been a recipient of the same false representation.”  
 
State attorneys general are more likely to seek, and state courts are more likely to award, public 
restitution that includes a claim procedure, sometimes requiring consumers to state some form of 
reliance as a condition of receiving an award, or the appointment of a special master to 
adjudicate individual consumer disputes as part of the restitution process.195 The public 
restitution in Figgie relied on a claim procedure that required consumers return the heat detectors 
to obtain a refund.196  
 
Like disgorgement, determining the amount of public restitution is almost always held to be a 
discretionary determination of the trial court.197 This provides the court with an opportunity to 
construct public restitution awards that fit the particular conditions of each case. In the following 
subparts, we discuss the need for a common set of principles to guide a pragmatic solution in 
difficult cases and propose a multi-factor test for use in such circumstances. 
  2. Need for clarifying law in difficult cases  
Consumers benefitting from the transaction or variations in consumer experience should usually 
be of little consequence with disgorgement, which is measured solely by violator gain. Concern 
with partial benefit and conduct or experience variation are more salient problems in public 
restitution because there is a direct link between these circumstances and measuring the amount 
of consumer loss. Requiring detailed proof of consumer loss is in tension with the need for a 
rough justice approach that allows public restitution to issue for deterrence purposes and the 
employ of an efficient, broad relief procedure that courts have favored in public enforcement 
actions. The relatively sparse case law on public restitution does not offer a substantial amount of 
guidance in balancing these concerns.  
 
The initial question is whether the court faces a difficult determination at all, and based on past 
case law, the answer typically is “no.” Under the reasonable approximation framework, most 
cases cannot be categorized as difficult. When a borrower is sold a loan that contains an illegal 
fee, it should be refunded absent extraordinary circumstances. When a consumer buys a product 
for which the seller promoted a key benefit that does not actually exist, there is no need to go 
farther, even if there is some residual value in the product.  
 
But what happens when the law violator can rebut the reasonable approximation? Some violators 
can establish that people affected by the violation obtained substantial benefit from the 
transaction or other market conduct, or can show a significant non-uniformity in conduct by the 
 
195 See, e.g., State v. Minnesota Sch. of Bus., Inc., 935 N.W.2d 124, 138–39 (Minn. 2019); State ex rel. Webster v. 
Areaco Inv. Co., 756 S.W.2d 633, 637 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); Consumer Prot. Div. Office of Atty. Gen. v. Consumer 
Pub. Co., 501 A.2d 48, 74 (1985). See Cox, et al., supra note 5 at 76 (22% of state attorney general enforcement 
actions in 2014 involved a claims procedure) 
196 F.T.C. v. Figgie Int’l, Inc., 994 F.2d 595, 606 (9th Cir. 1993). 
197 See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Commerce Planet, Inc., 815 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2016). Carter & Sheldon, supra note 100 
NCLC UDAP (observing that state “[c]ourts have displayed significant flexibility in making restitution awards.”)  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3809786
35 
 
violator or non-uniformity in the experience of the people affected that would impact the amount 
of consumer loss. The case law does not provide much guidance in these situations. There also is 
a need for a pragmatic test when the amount of consumer loss can be determined, but the 
distribution of that loss to particular people is hard to assess. This issue is of peripheral concern 
in disgorgement because the basis of the award is the deprivation of ill-gotten gain and any 
reasonable distribution process is proper. Public restitution is grounded in consumer loss, so the 
distribution of that award is integral to its purpose.  
 
  3. Proportionality Test  
 
We propose a four-factor balancing test for difficult public restation cases. The test would 
measure the public restitution award in a manner proportionate to the effect of the violation on 
consumer loss. The proportionality concept is modeled on Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, which is employed by courts in deciding the availability of discovery in 
litigation. That rule makes otherwise relevant information available in discovery if it is 
“proportional to the needs of the case,” based on six factors to be balanced by the court. Like a 
determination of public restitution, discovery decisions using the Rule 26(b)(1) proportionality 
test requires the exercise of discretion and a pragmatic, case-specific approach to each matter.198 
The four factors we identify below are derived from or are consistent with judicial decisions 
determining the propriety of, and measuring the amount of, public restitution when some form of 
difficult problem is present in determining public restitution.  
 
(1) Value, Difficulty and Cost of Determining Harm and Distributing Compensation to 
Individuals.  
 
The ease of identifying potential beneficiaries will vary in difficult cases. The same is true of the 
amount of the loss when there is variation in value of the benefit received by the consumer. A 
key factor in any difficult case will be to determine the practicality, and cost, of making award 
amounts that reflect the impact of variation in consumer experience. For example, the Maine 
Supreme Court confronted this problem of variation in conduct and experience in State v. Bob 
Chambers Ford, Inc., in which an auto dealer sold rustproofing but then failed to actually apply 
the product.199 The dealer argued that the district court improperly used a value of $125 for each 
customer because the product was sold as part of a package of services at a price often negotiated 
with the customer and the “rustproofing was often ‘included’ in the price of the automobile or 
‘thrown in’ by Chambers.” The Maine Supreme Court affirmed the $125 value as a reasonable 
approximation given the evidence presented as to cost of the service to customers.200 This result 
is consistent with a small dollar loss for which the cost of detailed proof would have been 
disproportionate to the task at hand.  
 
 
198 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment (“The court's responsibility, using all the 
information provided by the parties, is to consider these and all the other factors in reaching a case-specific 
determination of the appropriate scope of discovery.”); Adam N. Steinman, The End of an Era? Federal Civil 
Procedure After the 2015 Amendments, 66 EMORY L.J. 1, 32 (2016) (observing that Rule 26(b)(1) “anticipates a 
suitably pragmatic approach to resolving discovery disputes.”). 
199 State v. Bob Chambers Ford, Inc., 522 A.2d 362 (Me. 1987). 
200 Id. at 366. 
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The aim of public restitution is rough justice consistent with public enforcement purposes, and 
thus the size of the restitution amount sought will impose limits on the burden of the court to 
evaluate the impact of variations in underlying conduct or experience. Rule 26(b)(1) uses similar 
factors, allowing for discovery to be scaled to “the amount in controversy, …and whether the 
burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Relative loss amount 
matters in both terms of the overall and per capita award amount. A total consumer loss of $1 
million argues in favor of a detailed examination of consumer loss when there are 30 workers 
who were illegally deprived of wages, but against elaborate identification procedures when 
20,000 people bought a $50 piece of software. 
 
(2) Usefulness and Cost of a Claims Process or Similar Mechanism to Identify Loss Amount.  
 
There are reasons to avoid claims procedures in public restitution cases. The claim rates often are 
quite low and the cost of the procedure can be substantial. They can require consumers, many of 
whom may be unsophisticated, to read paperwork and engage with a legal process that will often 
confuse them about how to obtain relief or the impact on their rights of claiming relief. Claims 
procedures also can complicate the long and consistently stated desire for a public restitution 
process not encumbered by the same concerns as apply in private actions and authorizing broad, 
but efficient, remedial relief. Nonetheless, courts should weigh the costs and benefits of such a 
mechanism in difficult public restitution cases.  
 
Claim procedures are appropriate when it appears likely that a substantial number of consumers 
would have completed the transaction even in the absence of the violation, when a choice 
between a full refund and a return of a product is the best resolution for balancing these 
concerns, or when an additional compensation might be appropriate for a subset of consumers. A 
claims process would less likely be proper in a case involving small dollar losses because the 
cost of the procedure would almost always exceed any value in differentiating consumers by 
amount of loss. Nor would a claims procedure add value if variation in consumer loss arises from 
an issue that is hard to state in simple terms on a claim form, such as whether a borrower relied 
on compliance with a complex legal scheme. 
 
(3) Likelihood of Victims Recovering in A Private Action.  
 
Public compensation sometimes occurs in enforcement actions for which there is a parallel 
private lawsuit, often a class action, seeking compensation for consumers.201 Any recovery in a 
private action that has resolved obviously would be excluded in public restitution in the public 
enforcement case. When a parallel private action is pending, it may be appropriate to consider 
the possibility of relief in this action in determining public restitution in a difficult case. For 
instance, in an enforcement action in which the law violator lacks the resources to make full 
public restitution, if a subgroup of consumers is part of a certified class action that includes a co-
defendant capable of making those consumers whole, the court might structure the award 
accordingly to give these consumers a lower priority for payment.  
 
 
201 Velikonja, Public Compensation for Private Harm: Evidence from the SEC’s Fair Fund Distributions, supra note 
8, at 368 (a parallel private class action existed in 65% of SEC cases with Fair Fund awards); CFPB Arbitration Fact 
Sheet, supra note 44 at 17. 
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(4) Egregiousness of the Law Violation.  
 
Because deterrence underlies all public enforcement remedies, courts may consider the 
egregiousness of the underlying law violation in shaping public restitution. A company that 
targets homeowners to strip their equity by falsely representing that it can save the homeowner 
from foreclosure should have a high burden in challenging an enforcer’s reasonable 
approximation of consumer loss.202 The public interest demands a strong response in all remedies 
awarded against such a scheme. Conversely, deterrence is not promoted by placing as heavy a 
burden on a small business that violates a disclosure requirement not core to their business 
operation due to lack of compliance resources and with no evident intent.  
 
Using violation severity as a factor in shaping the amount or distribution of a public restitution 
award is not the same as suggesting the issuance of the award should depend on the 
egregiousness of the violator’s conduct. In one of the few cases rejecting entirely a request for 
public compensation, a district court did so on the grounds that the CFPB had failed to establish 
“that Defendants acted in bad faith, resorted to trickery or deception.”203 This is clearly 
erroneous. The CFPB, like almost all other public enforcers, is not required to establish intent, 
much less bad faith, and no other court has held that public compensation depends on such 
proof.204 But nothing prevents egregiousness of the violation from being considered as one factor 
in determining an appropriate amount of public restitution.  
 
 E. Examples 
 
This subpart provides four examples of how courts could determine awards using the principles 
of public compensation identified in this part. For each example, we analyze whether the award 
would differ under disgorgement or public restitution, how the reasonable approximation 
framework might be used in this circumstance, and how the proportionality test might be used in 
determining public restitution if it is applicable. 
 
Example #1. A professional sports team hires 60 high school students to take tickets and act as 
ushers in the stands during games. It calls these people “interns” and provides them a “stipend” 
equal to $3 per hour worked. The enforcer sues for violation of state minimum wage law due to 
misclassification of employees as interns, and it prevails on liability.  
 
It would make no difference in this simple case whether the enforcer used a disgorgement or 
public restitution theory in seeking public compensation. The difference between the amount 
 
202 See Steve Tripoli & Elizabeth Renuart, Dreams Foreclosed: The Rampant Theft of Americans’ Homes Through 
Equity-Stripping Foreclosure “Rescue” Scams, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER (2005), 
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_mortgage/scam/report-foreclosure-rescue-scams-2005.pdf. 
203 Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. CashCall, Inc., No. CV1507522JFWRAOX, 2018 WL 485963, at *13 (C.D. Cal. 
Jan. 19, 2018). 
204 Scienter is not a consideration in liability for UDAP violations. People by Abrams v. Am. Motor Club, Inc., 179 
A.D.2d 277 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992); see also Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Amerman, 645 F. App'x 938, 
944 (11th Cir. 2016) (rejecting argument that scienter is required for public compensation even though it is not 
required for liability, and stating that defendant “cites no legal authority, and we have found none.”). 
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paid to the workers and the amount that should have been paid under the minimum wage law is 
ill-gotten gain to the sports team, and the same amount is the loss to the workers. The calculation 
is easy to make as a reasonable approximation under either form of relief. The proportionality 
test has no role because reasonable approximation is not rebuttable once the determination is 
made that the workers were employees under the state wage law and thus minimum wage 
requirements applied. This type of ready substitution between the two types of public 
compensation is common in easy cases, such as the sale of worthless stock or useless products. 
 
Example #2. A drug company makes misleading statements to physicians about possible negative 
side effects of a competing prescription pharmaceutical, and the result of this conduct is an 
increase in market share for the company engaging in the violations. A substantial number of 
patients would have purchased the company’s drug regardless of this deception, while a number 
of other patients would have been prescribed the drug as a result of the violation. It would be 
very difficult to differentiate one group from the other given that the deception worked at the 
level of the prescribing physician. And it would be difficult to identify specific drug users given 
that drug fulfillment would typically happen through yet another channel and because of the 
confidentiality concerns involved in prescription drugs.  
 
An enforcer would clearly want to use disgorgement in this situation. A reasonable 
approximation of ill-gotten gain can be made by estimating the increase in company market 
share before and after the conduct. Such an estimate may require expert testimony to determine 
the increase and translate that data into dollar gain. Once this amount is reduced to a dollar gain, 
a reasonable distribution scheme to the drug users would be possible if it is a drug regularly 
taken for a chronic condition by requiring the violator to distribute the contribution through 
rebates to future users. It may be necessary to forfeit the money to a public treasury or fund if it 
is not possible to develop such a distribution scheme. 
 
Public restitution, however, is a difficult lift in this scenario. The costs and uncertainty of even a 
rough approximation of consumer loss would be daunting, thus invoking the proportionality test. 
Given the indirect nature of the deception through physicians, a claim procedure would add little 
value because the drug users would not have directly encountered the deception. The same 
problems facing a public enforcer would likely make a class not possible to ascertain and certify, 
thus making it unlikely that private recourse would be a factor. If the deception of physicians 
was egregious and resulted in huge gains to the violator, such as a doubling of market share, a 
pragmatic rough justice approach may allow measuring the loss by unjust gain and distributing in 
the same manner as disgorgement. Otherwise, an enforcer lacking disgorgement authority likely 
would use an estimate of the ill-gotten gain to increase the requested amount of civil penalties. 
 
Example #3. A seller of discount buying club memberships sold through telemarketers enters 
into a contract with a hotel chain allowing it to sell subscriptions to former guests of the hotel. 
The hotel provides the seller with the names and contact information for former guests. The 
seller agrees to pay the hotel 10% of all revenue it collects for telemarketing sales of these 
memberships. The seller pays a third-party telemarketing service to conduct the solicitations. 
The enforcer sues the hotel and the seller. It alleges that the telemarketing solicitations were 
deceptive about the membership benefits and deceptive about charging the full annual cost of 
$100 for the membership after the expiration of a free trial period. The seller and the hotel are 
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found jointly and severally liable for violations of the Telemarketing Sales Rule (TSR).205 The 
enforcer introduces evidence from a survey sample showing that at least 90% and up to 98% of 
the former hotel guests charged for the memberships had no awareness that their credit card had 
been charged $100/year for the membership. The seller and hotel do not present any evidence 
rebutting this fact. The court issues an injunction against both defendants. 
 
Under case law prior to Liu, disgorgement of the full amount of the revenue by the hotel to all 
the former hotel guests would have been the likely result. It is reasonable for the enforcer to 
estimate that if more than 90% of the customers were not aware they were paying for the 
product, that essentially all of this revenue is an ill-gotten gain. Liu, however, may change this 
outcome. The hotel received only 10% of the revenue, and thus as an initial matter is likely to be 
held liable only for the profits it received.206 Joint and several liability as to disgorgement for the 
seller and the hotel may run afoul of the limitations enunciated in Liu, unless the enforcer can 
establish that the hotel is jointly liable under traditional equitable principles. The court’s 
authority to award full disgorgement against the hotel in this situation, therefore, turns on this 
now murky legal issue. 
 
Obtaining a disgorgement award of the full amount of the charge against the seller also would 
encounter some uncertainty under Liu, which allows for the deduction of “legitimate expenses,” 
but excepts expenses “fueling a fraudulent scheme.” The third-party telemarketer costs would 
seem to fall into the fraudulent scheme category, but again, Liu has unsettled the law in this way. 
 
Public restitution is a more promising avenue for use by an enforcer to obtain an award of public 
compensation in the full amount of the charge. The same reasonable approximation applies here, 
as consumers were unaware of the charge and thus suffered a loss in the full amount of the 
charge. As no evidence by the defendant rebuts that a full refund is proper, there is no need to 
invoke the proportionality test. Nor is public restitution, as an expressly authorized remedy, 
subject to the limits of traditional equity. Accordingly, any liability theory for holding the hotel 
jointly liable, such as the assisting and facilitating liability provision of the TSR, would be 
sufficient to impose joint liability for public restitution.207 
 
Example #4. A company replaces roofs on residential homes. The company generally receives no 
complaints about the pricing or quality of its basic roof replacement service, but it engages in a 
pattern of falsely telling homeowners that the company has found an unexpected problem with 
the homeowner’s roof and obtaining a “work order” that increases the price of the roof 
replacement when no defect actually existed. An enforcer sues for UDAP violations. Evidence 
from a trial establishes the following: (1) about 10,000 homeowners had their roofs replaced 
and were subject to at least one work order, with an average of 2.4 orders per homeowner (or a 
total of 24,000 work orders), with 30% of homeowners subject to only one order and 10% of 
homeowners paying for 5 or more orders; (2) corporate level employees testified that “about 
half” of the work change orders were based on legitimate problems with the house, and the other 
half were bogus, although “that percentage varied tremendously by which crew was working the 
 
205 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. pt. 310. 
206 Liu, at 1945 (approvingly citing cases limiting recovery for ill-gotten gains to revenue actually received by the 
defendant). 
207 16 C.F.R. pt. 310.3(b). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3809786
40 
 
house, as about a quarter of the  crews almost always employed the fraud scheme for more pay, 
about the same number would never do it, and the rest were in between;” (3) the average cost of 
the work order to the homeowner was $3,000, and there was no credible evidence that this cost 
varied between legitimate and bogus work orders; (4) there is no means to definitively determine 
whether any particular work order was bogus by just looking at the documentation, but rather a 
professional inspection of the roof with knowledge of the work order history would reveal the 
bogus orders in the vast majority of cases. 
 
Disgorgement would be a more efficient means of obtaining public compensation in this 
circumstance. Applying a public restitution measure also would work, and the proportionality 
test for public restitution would offer a more effective means of distributing public compensation 
in a manner that tracks consumer loss.  
 
For disgorgement, an enforcer could make a reasonable approximation of the ill-gotten gain here 
by estimating the total homeowner payments for bogus work orders at $36 million (24,000 
orders * 50% bogus * $3,000). Based on the trial evidence, it is difficult to discern how the 
roofing company could present detailed evidence to rebut this presumption. Any costs incurred 
by the company in completing a total bogus work change order qualifies as an expense “fueling a 
fraudulent scheme,” and thus are not excludable from the disgorgement amount. Pro rata 
distribution of this money based on the number of work orders for which the homeowner paid, or 
the dollar value of those work orders, would be reasonable, although there would be a variety of 
reasonable schemes for distributing the disgorgement money.  
 
A reasonable estimate of consumer loss for public restitution would be the same amount. The 
revenue to the roofing company from bogus orders, without deduction for expenses, is the same 
as the unnecessary payments made by homeowners. The need to more closely relate public 
restitution to consumer loss, however, complicates the situation. A substantial number of 
consumers, perhaps about 15,000 (30,000 homeowners with one work change order * 50% 
bogus), may have had no loss. Conversely, about 1,000 homeowners paid for 5 or more work 
orders, and perhaps some homeowners paid much more than $3,000/order for bogus orders, 
suggesting a possibility of a large uncompensated loss for a few people.  
 
The proportionality test may be applied to resolve this situation. All the factors weigh in favor of 
ignoring any concern that some homeowners without a loss might be compensated. There is no 
cost-efficient means of determining these homeowners given the cost and disruption of 
scheduling thousands of professional inspections. A claims process would be of little use without 
the information from the professional inspection, and a private right of action is infeasible for the 
small dollar loss. The egregiousness of a completely bogus charge supports the rough justice of 
paying homeowners who might not have experienced loss.  
 
The test suggests a different result with the small number of homeowners who suffered 
noticeably larger losses than would be compensated by a pro rata distribution. The fact of the 
larger dollar loss changes the relative value of expending money to more accurately determine 
the amount of the loss. Private actions still would be unlikely in this dollar range. A claims 
process might be useful in this narrow context, however. For example, homeowners who paid 
over a determined dollar amount in work change orders could be given the opportunity to apply 
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for a home inspection to determine if the pro rata distribution under-compensated them. The 
costs of this process would be ancillary to determining the loss, and thus properly an additional 
expense imposed on the roofing company. The court could exercise its discretion about how 
much of a fund should be reserved by reducing the pro rata distribution, and whether it would be 
proper to make the roofing company pay any claims in excess of this fund amount.  
 
IV. PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT DEFINES PUBLIC COMPENSATION  
 
The law of public compensation had a consistent arc for decades. John Wade & Robert 
Kamenshine writing in 1969 recognized that public compensation in market protection civil law 
enforcement should rely upon relaxed standards of proof.208 And in more recent years, empirical 
scholarship on public compensation has provided a baseline of knowledge about the use of this 
remedy by public enforcers and how it fits into public enforcement strategies, confirming the 
broad availability of this relief in public enforcement lawsuits.209 Even commentators opposing 
this consensus recognize the liberal framework courts have employed in deciding public 
compensation. In arguing for more restrictions on public compensation, for instance, George 
Roach observes that “[r]eading the case opinions in the FTC and FDA cases seem to indicate an 
increasing inclination of the court to devise remedies, equitable or not, that will help the 
deceived consumer the most,” leading him to ask: “[w]hy do federal agencies win revenue 
disgorgement and other remedies based on uniquely favorable measures?”210 
 
In Subpart A, we examine how a handful of recent court decisions are unsettling the traditionally 
favorable measures of public compensation by shifting the law closer to the legal principles for 
resolving private claims. This subpart describes how recent decisions of federal courts, mostly 
within the last year, have begun to undermine the consensus doctrine by more closely aligning 
pubic compensation with the law governing private claims. Then, in Subpart B, we set out the 
characteristics of public enforcement that underlie why courts have afforded “uniquely 
favorable” treatment in public compensation and highlight four normative considerations that 
favor this traditional law of public compensation.  
  
A. Shift Toward Treating Public Compensation Synonymously with Private Rights 
 
Liu unsettled the law of disgorgement with two somewhat contradictory moves. In affirming the 
SEC’s right to disgorgement—the issue left hanging in Kokesh—the Court explicitly found 
irrelevant the distinctions among various forms of private rights to equitable relief, holding that 
disgorgement was properly grounded in general principles of traditional equity, “[n]o matter the 
 
208 John W. Wade & Robert D. Kamenshine, Restitution for Defrauded Consumers: Making the Remedy Effective 
Through Suit by Government Agency, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1031, 1057 (1969). 
209 Velikonja, Public Compensation for Private Harm: Evidence from the SEC’s Fair Fund Distributions, supra note 
8 at 336; see also Winship, supra note 172 at 1011; Velikonja, Public Enforcement After Kokesh: Evidence from 
SEC Actions, supra note 78 at 402 (2019). Christopher L. Peterson, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Law 
Enforcement: An Empirical Review, 90 TUL. L. REV. 1057, 1076 (2016); Cox, et al., supra note 5 at 55. 
210 Roach, supra note 57, at 4. Roach further states “This article is an outgrowth of the author's ongoing survey of 
the consistency of the definition and measurement of restitutionary monetary remedies in all areas of commercial 
litigation. It became apparent early in the survey that the measurement of agencies' remedies under the doctrine of 
implied jurisdiction differs substantially both between the different agencies and in comparison to other areas of the 
law that measure restitution.”. 
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label” or “whatever the name.”211 The Court did not require that the SEC identify a particular 
form of equitable relief that would apply in private suits, but accepted the idea that 
“disgorgement” described a cognizable form of equitable relief in public enforcement. 
 
At the same time, in warning that federal courts had been too lax in awarding disgorgement, Liu 
describes disgorgement without reference to public enforcement. The concept of deterrence goes 
unmentioned in Liu. Instead, the Court cites almost exclusively to precedent grounded in specific 
forms of equitable relief familiar for the resolution of disputes among private litigants; for 
instance, a suit for breach of trust by an actuary,212 and a 19th century case regarding a 
partnership accounting.213 Justice Thomas argued in dissent in Liu, although from an entirely 
different perspective than presented here, that equitable concepts like accounting have “a well-
accepted definition,” unlike the use of disgorgement as a term to describe public 
compensation.214  
 
Recent decisions upending the law governing FTC rights to relief present differently than Liu. A 
2019 decision of the Seventh Circuit, FTC v. Credit Bureau Ctr., LLC., overturned decades of 
precedent holding that section 13 of the FTC Act authorized the FTC to obtain disgorgement.215 
In FTC v. AMG Capital Mgmt., LLC, the Ninth Circuit rejected the reasoning of the Seventh 
Circuit based on prior Ninth Circuit precedent, although a special concurrence by the judge 
writing the opinion expressed sympathy with the Seventh Circuit’s view on the matter.216 The 
Supreme Court initially accepted certiorari of both cases, but later vacated its decision to review 
Credit Bureau, and now is deciding only AMG.217 Recently, the Third Circuit joined this attack 
on FTC authority by holding in an antitrust case that section 13 did not authorize the FTC to 
obtain disgorgement.218  
 
The Seventh Circuit decision in Credit Bureau is most instructive. The critical commonality 
between Liu and Credit Bureau is reliance on the law of equity in resolving private claims with 
no regard for constructing remedies consistent with the rationale of public enforcement. It frames 
the problem solely as a question of “modern implied-remedies jurisprudence.”219 It concludes 
that the FTC Act section 13 injunctive provision language, read together with the section 19 
express authority for restitution, provide no implied authority for the FTC to obtain 
disgorgement. Except the court never uses the word disgorgement to describe this relief.220 It 
describes the relief sought by the FTC as restitution and, more importantly, it treats decades of 
 
211 Id. 
212 Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 113 S. Ct. 2063, 124 L. Ed. 2d 161 (1993). 
213 Ambler v. Whipple, 87 U.S. 546, 547, 22 L. Ed. 403 (1874) 
214 Liu, at 1951 (Thomas, J, dissenting). 
215 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Credit Bureau Ctr. LLC, 937 F.3d 764 (7th Cir. 2019). 
216 AMG Capital Mgmt. LLC v. Fed. Trad Comm’n, 141 S. Ct. 194 (2020). 
217 FTC v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC, 937 F.3d 764, 777 (7th Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 141 S. Ct. 194, 207 L. Ed. 
2d 1118 (2020), vacated sub nom. FTC v. Credit Bureau Ctr., No. 19-825, 2020 WL 6551765 (U.S. Nov. 9, 2020). 
218 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. AbbVie Inc., 976 F.3d 327 (3d Cir. 2020). The FTC relies on the same statutes—sections 
13 and 19 of the FTC Act—in UDAP and antitrust enforcement actions; see also  
Stein, supra note 36 at (describing the development of FTC policy on disgorgement in antitrust cases and a 2019 
Third Circuit case presaging AbbieVie). 
219 Credit Bureau Center, at 779. 
220 The opinion makes two references to “restitution and disgorgement” in parentheticals summarizing holdings in 
cases between private litigants. Credit Bureau Center, at 772, 782. 
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FTC decisions in federal appellate courts as a superficially reasoned subset of the law of implied 
remedies, making no reference to and according no importance to the public enforcement 
rationales repeatedly emphasized in those decisions. 
 
The Credit Bureau decision identifies the Supreme Court’s decision in Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc. 
as the main pillar of its reasoning.221 Meghrig involved a dispute between a Kentucky Fried 
Chicken franchisee and the prior owner of the real estate in which the franchisee argued for an 
equitable remedy in restitution under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). In 
refusing to recognize such a private right to equitable relief, the Court distinguished between the 
remedial scheme for public enforcement by the EPA under RCRA and other statutes, and the 
private right to relief. It noted that under RCRA the private right of action was circumscribed by 
federal enforcement, and that “no citizen suit can proceed if either the EPA or the State has 
commenced, and is diligently prosecuting, a separate enforcement action.”222 The court 
concluded: 
 
Without considering whether a private party could seek to obtain an injunction requiring 
another party to pay cleanup costs which arise after a RCRA citizen suit has been properly 
commenced, cf. United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 211–213 (C.A.3 1982) (requiring 
funding of a diagnostic study is an appropriate form of relief in a suit brought by the 
Administrator under § 6973), or otherwise recover cleanup costs paid out after the 
invocation of RCRA's statutory process, we agree with the Meghrigs that a private party 
cannot recover the cost of a past cleanup effort under RCRA.223 
 
Indeed, the majority opinion in Credit Bureau approvingly quotes from a portion of Meghrig 
distinguishing Porter in which the Court twice observes it is adjudicating a case involving a 
private dispute.224 The court in Credit Bureau refers to a “spectrum” a cases of which implied 
equitable remedies were denied or granted, but contrasts only two cases with private litigants 
denied equitable relief with two cases brought by the FDA allowing disgorgement as public 
compensation, and in both of the FDA cases the courts noted the importance of the public 
enforcement context in their decisions.225 The court in Credit Bureau then cites the only federal 
case in which federal courts denied disgorgement as an equitable remedy to an enforcer—the 
 
221 Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479 (1996). 
222 Id. at 486. 
223 Id. at 488. Notably, the Third Circuit decision in Price involved a public enforcement action in which the court 
required the defendant to pay for testing sought by the EPA. The court justified imposition of this remedy as 
“preventive rather than compensatory” because “[t]he qualities of mercy and practicality have made equity the 
instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation between the public interest and private needs.” United States v. 
Price, 688 F.2d 204, 211-212 (3d Cir. 1982). 
224 Price at 781 (“Congress did not intend for a private citizen to be able to undertake a cleanup and then proceed to 
recover its costs under [the] RCRA” and that “it cannot be assumed that Congress intended to authorize by 
implication additional judicial remedies for private citizens suing under the statute.”). 
225 Id. at 782-783. United States v. Lane Labs-USA Inc., 427 F.3d 219, 223 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Though the FDCA does 
not specifically authorize restitution, such specificity is not required where the government properly invokes a 
court's equitable jurisdiction under this statute”); Lane-Labs-USA Inc. at 225 (citing to FTC, SEC, CFTC and ICC 
cases permitting public compensation); United States v. Rx Depot, Inc., 438 F.3d 1052, 1057 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(“Meghrig is distinguishable from the present case, and from Porter and Mitchell, because it involved a controversy 
between private parties relying on a statutory provision for private causes of action, not an enforcement action by the 
government to protect the public,” and citing Porter for support).  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3809786
44 
 
DOJ seeking disgorgement for RICO violations. Not mentioned in any of this discussion are the 
dozens of consistent decisions over decades allowing disgorgement under a broad range of 
public enforcement statutes based on the need to create deterrence from public enforcement.226  
After reaching its conclusion that the FTC lacks disgorgement authority, the court in Credit 
Bureau addresses and dismisses the fact that it is deciding a public enforcement action, stating 
that “the difference in plaintiffs—private citizens in Meghrig and a federal agency here—isn't 
material.”227 
 
Liu and the seventh Circuit’s Credit Bureau decision are part of a very recent trend of courts 
using private law concepts to restrict the ability of enforcement agencies to obtain public 
compensation. For example, the Eleventh Circuit held that the “proximate cause” requirement for 
public restitution in the CFTC statute should be read as imposing on the CFTC the causation 
burden of proof to which private litigants are held under common law tort principles.228 The 
court reversed a trial court award of restitution to investors who had lost money after investing 
money in precious metals futures through traders unregistered with CFTC in violation of 
registration requirements. The court analogized the situation to paying an attorney who lacked a 
legal license, stating that “a client might well prevail in court despite the lawyer's unlicensed 
status.”229 And, in a post-trial order, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California 
held that the CFPB could not obtain restitution for consumers who made loan payments they did 
not owe without first proving the defendants “set out to deliberately mislead consumers . . . or 
otherwise intended to defraud them.”230 In both cases, courts imported private tort law 
concepts—causation in the former and scienter in the latter—into federal statutory public 
compensation proceedings.  
 
These recent cases restricting public compensation come after a decade of scholarship debating 
the statutory foundation of the public compensation authorities of the SEC, FTC, and the 
FDA.231 In affirming the SEC’s disgorgement power in Liu, the Supreme Court put to rest the 
notion that public compensation cannot be based on public enforcer statutory authority, while 
inviting years of litigation by enforcement defendants to narrow the reach of that authority. The 
Supreme Court’s pending decision in FTC v. AMG, which focuses on construction of the FTC 
 
226 Price at 783 (citing United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 396 F.3d 1190 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).  
227 Price at 784. 
228 U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. S. Tr. Metals, Inc., 894 F.3d 1313, 1328-1333 (11th Cir. 2018). 
229 Id. at 1330 
230 Consumer Fin. Protec. Bureau v. CashCall, Inc., CV1507522JFWRAOX, 2018 WL 485963, at *12 (C.D. Cal. 
Jan. 19, 2018). The CFPB initially appealed the CashCall court’s order to the Ninth Circuit, but after a transition to 
leadership under the Trump Administration appointees, the Bureau voluntarily withdrew their appeal. Consumer 
Fin. Protec. Bureau v. CashCall, Inc., 18-55407, 2019 WL 5390028, at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 21, 2019). 
231  The writing in this area reflects a mix of practitioners, heavily weighted toward the defense bar, and legal 
scholars. SEC: Compare Ryan, supra note 154, at 11; with Gabaldon, supra note 6, at 1612; Donna M. Nagy, The 
Statutory Authority for Court-Ordered Disgorgement in Sec Enforcement Actions, 71 SMU L. REV. 895, 901 (2018). 
FTC: Compare Peter C. Ward, Restitution for Consumers Under the Federal Trade Commission Act: Good 
Intentions or Congressional Intentions?, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1139 (1992); Beales & Muris, supra note 95, at 21 
(questioning the legitimacy of. FTC disgorgement); with Vladeck, supra note 95. FDA: In the years immediately 
before the Third Circuit decided Lane Labs, practitioners of FDA law wrote a bevy of articles debating the merits of 
that agency’s authority to obtain disgorgement. See William V. Vodra & Arthur N. Levine, Anchors Away: The 
Food and Drug Administration's Use of Disgorgement Abandons Legal Moorings, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 1 n.4 
(2004) (citing numerous articles in the same journal on the issue of FDA disgorgement authority). 
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Act remedy provisions, could strip the FTC of the public compensation authority on which it has 
primarily relied for almost forty years.232 That would force the FTC to choose between 
abandoning money relief entirely or forcing its enforcement actions into a cumbersome multi-
stage process of administrative proceedings followed by a separate judicial action seeking public 
restitution with an additional proof.233 This result would widen an already noticeable gap in 
enforcement authority between the lesser remedies afforded the FTC, which has more limited 
civil penalty powers, and the authority of other enforcers.234 And the Court’s ruling could signal 
an ominous future for the public compensation authority of the FDA and other market protection 
civil enforcement agencies, which likely would come under sustained attack by enforcement 
defendants facing courts that have abandoned the public enforcement rationales for liberal public 
compensation awards. 
 
B. Private Rights Should Not Define Public Compensation 
In establishing the traditional reasonable approximation framework, courts routinely cited the 
rationale of deterrence and the special position of public enforcers as justifying the loosened 
proof standard and causation presumptions. Indeed, disgorgement as a form of compensation has 
little purchase outside of public compensation.235 As the Second Circuit has put it, 
“disgorgement is a distinctly public-regarding remedy, available only to government entities 
seeking to enforce explicit statutory provisions,” and other courts have held the same.236 In this 
subpart, we examine unique attributes of public enforcement that have shaped, and should 
continue to shape, the practice of public compensation in courts. In particular, we highlight four 
key differences between public compensation and private law in market protection regimes: the 
statutorily authorized position of public enforcers, deterrence as the touchstone of public 
enforcement, the exercise of enforcer discretion in seeking remedies, and the absence of class 
procedure. 
 
  1. Statutorily Authorized Position of Public Enforcers 
 
The first sentence of Article II in the U.S. Constitution of the vests “executive power” in the 
President who in turn appoints the various minsters, officers, and heads of the departments of 
 
232 F.T.C. v. H. N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107, 1112-1113 (9th Cir. 1982). Beales & Muris, supra note 95, at 23 
(noting Singer was first case determining FTC disgorgement authority). 
233 See supra part x. 
234 Recognizing the potential disruption to their law enforcement program from the AMG appeal, the FTC has 
already testified before Congressional about the potential need to remedy this situation following the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision in Credit Bureau. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Testifies At an Oversight Hearing 
before the Senate Commerce Committee (Aug. 5, 2020) (https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2020/08/ftc-testifies-oversight-hearing-senate-commerce-committee). 
235 Cf Melvin A Eisenberg, The Disgorgement Interest in Contract Law, 105 MICH. L. REV. 559, 597-99 (2006) 
(arguing a disgorgement interest should be available in private breach of contract cases, but noting its conspicuous 
rarity in caselaw). 
236 F.T.C. v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 654 F.3d 359, 372 (2d Cir. 2011). Accord F.T.C. v. LoanPointe, LLC, 525 F. 
App'x 696, 698 (10th Cir. 2013) (citing Bronson); S.E.C. v. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105, 117 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(“‘disgorgement’ is not available primarily to compensate victims,” and citing a district court holding that 
disgorgement as public compensation “‘springs out of the policy of public enforcement of the provisions of the 
securities laws.”); State v. Macko, No. HHDCV126031858S, 2016 WL 4268383, at *11 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 1, 
2016) (citing Bronson). 
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government with the advice and consent of the Senate.237 The Constitution does not expressly 
define executive power. But, the founders envisioned an energetic executive branch of 
government empowered to vigorously implement the laws of the United States. For example, in 
the Federalist Papers Alexander Hamilton explained:  
 
Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. It is 
essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks; it is not less essential to 
the steady administration of the laws; to the protection of property against those irregular and 
high-handed combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice; to the 
security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy.  
. . .  A feeble Executive implies a feeble execution of the government. A feeble execution is 
but another phrase for a bad execution; and a government ill executed, whatever it may be in 
theory, must be, in practice, a bad government.238 
 
Or, as James Madison wrote, “the natural province of the executive magistrate is 
to execute laws.”239  
 
While a full scholarly treatment of the limits of this executive power “might well take thirty 
years and 7,000 pages,”240 the Constitution clearly tasks the executive branch to “take care that 
the laws be faithfully executed.”241 Although all power in the American constitutional order 
derives from the consent of the people, the executive branch acts as a “caretaker of the public 
good” by responding to the opportunities and emergencies that arise in the course of events.242 
As Louis Fisher explained, the framers “were not primarily theoreticians,” but rather “had served 
in public life and wanted a government that would function effectively.”243 Officials 
implementing executive power who are duly selected through our process of elections, 
nominations, advice, consent, and appointment take on a qualitatively different role and authority 
to execute law than any private litigant. 
 
Over time Congress has seen fit to expand the number, complexity, and independence of 
administrative agencies within the executive branch. In 1913 Congress adopted the Federal 
Reserve Act creating a decentralized, hybrid public-private central bank in order to balance the 
competing interests of private banks and populist fear of their economic power.244 In 1914 
Congress adopted the Federal Trade Commission Act creating a five member commission 
charged with stopping “unfair” competition.245 In the Great Depression, New Deal legislation 
strengthened the authorities of these agencies and forged the Securities and Exchange 
 
237 U.S. CONST., Art II. 
238 THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton). 
239 James Madison, Letters of Helvidius No. 1 (Aug.-Sept. 1793), in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 138, 145 
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906); see also Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute 
the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 663 (1994). 
240 Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 852 (1989). 
241 U.S. CONST., Art II. 
242 JEREMY D. BAILEY, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND EXECUTIVE POWER 10 (2007). 
243 LOUIS FISHER, THE LAW OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH: PRESIDENTIAL POWER at 4 (2014). 
244 PETER CONTI-BROWN, THE POWER AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE at 6, 21-23 (2017).  
245 Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58); PETER C. WARD, FEDERAL 
TRADE COMMISSION: LAW, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1:2 (2020). 
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Commission and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in their mold. Congress created the 
Food and Drug Administration, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the 
National Credit Union Administration, and the Commodities Futures Trading Commission, and, 
most recently, the CFPB to protect and enhance the markets through which the American people 
conduct their commercial affairs. 
 
In the modern administrative state, Congress (and, for their part, state legislatures) wrote market 
protection statutes with these administrative agencies as integral structures of the law. For the 
enabling legislation creating each of these aspects of executive power, a public enforcer is a 
central feature of the legal regime. Administrative agencies recruit and train a professional civil 
service with broad mechanisms of information acquisition and evaluation, including public 
requests for information, notice and comment rulemaking, complaint taking, market monitoring, 
and business, community, and scientific advisory boards. The statutory frameworks of market 
protection laws presume access to this type of regulatory and enforcement expertise as a baseline 
component of Congressional vision. While some statutes afford members of the public a private 
cause of action, public civil law enforcement plays a statutory role that does not have an 
analogue in private cases.246 Despite centuries of change, the executive role of modern civil 
public law enforcement draws upon the same exercise of executive power George Washington 
cited in putting down the Whiskey Rebellion: “it is my duty to see the Laws executed: to permit 
them to be trampled upon with impunity would be repugnant to” that duty.247 The “uniquely 
favorable” position of public enforcement agencies seeking public compensation is based on the 
constitutional duty of the executive branch to implement law.248 
 
  2. Deterrence Rationale of Public Enforcement Justifies Liberal Public 
Compensation Principles 
 
Deterrence of violations of market protection statutory schemes is the fundamental purpose of 
civil public enforcement. The pursuit of compensation for harm primarily drives private claims. 
Courts and scholars widely agree on these points.249 Yet there is no shortage of judicial opinions 
and scholarly literature to muddy the picture; that point out the deterring effect of private actions 
 
246 U.S. S.E.C. v. Quan, 817 F.3d 583, 594 (8th Cir. 2016). 
247 Letter to Alexander Hamilton (Sept. 7, 1792), in 32 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 144 (John C. Fitzpatrick 
ed., 1939). Cf Ted Cruz, The Obama Administration's Unprecedented Lawlessness, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLICY 
63, 69 (2015) (arguing selective non-enforcement violates the “take care” clause of Article II). 
248 Cf Roach, supra note 57, at 4.  
249 See, e.g., Kokesh v. S.E.C. 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1643 (2017) (“the primary purpose of disgorgement orders is to deter 
violations of the securities laws by depriving violators of their ill-gotten gains.”); Velikonja, Public Compensation 
for Private Harm: Evidence from the SEC’s Fair Fund Distributions, supra note 8, at 359 (“The primary purpose of 
the SEC's enforcement activity is deterrence.”); Jack B. Weinstein, Compensation for Mass Private Delicts: 
Evolving Roles of Administrative, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 947, 952 (2001) (noting that government agencies “seek to 
deter by fines, injunctions, and orders for disgorgement and restitution”); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Modes of Regulatory 
Enforcement and the Problem of Administrative Discretion, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1275, 1285 (1999) (“Furthermore, 
unlike public enforcement regimes, private enforcement generally has as its primary purpose compensation of 
victims, with only a secondary purpose of preventing or deterring violations.”); Tamar Frankel, Implied Rights of 
Action, 67 VA. L. REV. 553, 570-71 (1981) (noting that private enforcement of the securities acts may be “ill-suited” 
to the deterrence objectives of those statutes--but also recommending devices for making private suits serve “a 
legitimate compensatory purpose”). 
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and the compensatory effect of public enforcement.250 Public compensation combines violator 
deterrence and compensation to individuals, contributing to this blurring of purpose. The 
underlying deterrence rationale of public enforcement nonetheless applies to public 
compensation and shapes its use.  
 
Both public enforcers and the courts have repeatedly pointed to deterrence as the primary 
purpose of public compensation. This position is obvious in disgorgement cases, as the 
measuring stick for the award is an amount needed to deprive the defendant of unjust gain rather 
than the loss suffered by the potential beneficiary of public compensation. As the Court held in 
Porter: “Future compliance may be more definitely assured if one is compelled to restore one's 
illegal gains.”251 The SEC has stated since the 1970s that its disgorgement remedy primarily is 
based on deterrence, and courts repeatedly affirm that deterrence justifies disgorgement in SEC 
cases.252 Similarly, courts have held that deterrence is the purpose of disgorgement in FTC 
cases253 and in state attorneys general cases.254 Courts also have cited deterrence as the basis for 
restitution awards based on consumer loss.255  
 
Deterrence as a rationale for public compensation supports a much more liberal interpretative 
frame for determining when it should be awarded. The Second Circuit described this link 
between deterrence and lower proof requirements in disgorgement cases: “because ‘the primary 
purpose of disgorgement orders is to deter violations of the [ ] laws by depriving violators of 
 
250 See Bradley J. Bondi, Dangerous Liaisons: Collective Scienter in SEC Enforcement Actions, 6 NYU J. OF L. & 
BUS. 2 (2009); Jared N. Jennings, Simi Kedia & Shivaram Rajgopal, The Deterrent Effects of SEC Enforcement and 
Class Action Litigation, HARV. L. SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOV. (2011).   
251 Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 400 (1946). 
252  U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 308(C) OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, at 
20, available at https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/sox308creport.pdf  (“While the Commission may seek to return 
disgorged funds to injured investors, the main objective of disgorgement is to take the profits away from wrongdoers 
and thereby make violations unprofitable.); Gabaldon, supra note 6 at 1637-1639 (“In 1972, the Commission's 
Annual Reports to Congress began to disclose both that it regarded disgorgement as a part of its arsenal and that the 
purpose of disgorgement was deterrence rather than compensation for particular victims.”); Velikonja, Public 
Enforcement After Kokesh: Evidence from SEC Actions, supra note 78 at 402 (observing that “the Court held [in 
Kokesh] disgorgement is imposed to deter violations”). See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Contorinis, 743 F.3d 296, 301 (2d Cir. 
2014) (“Because disgorgement's underlying purpose is to make lawbreaking unprofitable for the law-breaker, it 
satisfies its design when the lawbreaker returns the fruits of his misdeeds, regardless of any other ends it may or may 
not accomplish.”) See Gabaldon, supra note 6 at 105 (collecting cases in which courts hold that SEC disgorgement 
is based on a deterrence rationale).  
253 F.T.C. v. LoanPointe, LLC, 525 F. App'x 696, 702 (10th Cir. 2013) (“the two purposes of disgorgement (are) 
stripping the wrongdoer of ill-gotten gains and deterring improper conduct, without penalizing appellants.”). 
254 State ex rel. Kidwell v. Master Distributors, Inc., 101 Idaho 447, 455–56, 615 P.2d 116, 124–25 (1980) (“Only a 
substantial likelihood that defendants who have engaged in unfair or deceptive trade practices will be subject to 
restitutionary orders will deter many with a mind to engage in sharp practices.”); State v. Fonk's Mobile Home Park 
& Sales, Inc., 343 N.W.2d 820, 824 (Ct. App. 1983) (“the injunction is tied with restitution in order to assure that 
the merchant is deprived of the illegal fruits of past practices and to deter future illegal conduct”). 
255 State v. Masters Distributors, Inc., 615 P.2d 116, 124-125 (“Only a substantial likelihood that defendants... will 
be subject to restitutionary orders will deter many with a mind to engage in sharp practices.”); State ex rel. Kidwell 
v. Master Distributors, Inc., 615 P.2d 116, 124–25 (1980) (“The Idaho Consumer Protection Act indicates a 
legislative intent to deter deceptive or unfair trade practices and to provide relief for consumers exposed to 
proscribed practices…Only a substantial likelihood that defendants who have engaged in unfair or deceptive trade 
practices will be subject to restitutionary orders will deter many with a mind to engage in sharp practices.”). See 
PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 56. 
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their ill-gotten gains,’ … a regulatory agency seeking disgorgement need not identify specific 
victims to whom payment is due ‘in good conscience,’ as it would be required to do if seeking to 
impose a constructive trust” in a private dispute.256  
 
Professor Garry Gabison cited the economic justification for this position as follows: “(Public 
compensation) also force(s) the lawbreaker to internalize the cost of lawbreaking, which deters 
inefficient future lawbreaking--much like civil penalties.”257 Gabison concludes that “[s]ince 
private and public actors value deterrence differently, they approach enforcement different.”258  
 
The distinction between public compensation as a remedy and the right to compensation linked 
to the elements of a private claim is related to the critical role of deterrence in shaping public 
compensation law. As the statutorily-authorized entity enforcing a market protection law, public 
enforcers almost always have the right to bring an action solely on proof of a law violation. 
Private plaintiffs, with narrow exceptions, can bring claims only when they can allege they were 
injured by the violation, or the like.259 For example, there is no private right of action under 
federal UDAP laws—only the FTC, the CFPB, or a financial institution’s prudential regulator 
can bring claims for violation of these laws—but every state has a private right of action for a 
UDAP violation.260 Yet these UDAP laws mostly require proof of injury or damage as an 
element of the claim.261 Compensation, therefore, is not only central to the purpose of private 
claims, but is typically a requirement of most private claims. In a public action, the enforcer only 
has the burden to prove a violation; having done so, public compensation arises as one of the 
remedies appropriate to promote deterrence of future violations. 
 
Understanding public compensation as justified by deterrence also makes sense because public 
compensation is almost always accompanied by forward-looking injunctive relief, whereas 
private suits—even class actions—typically do not obtain prospective relief.262 A study of one 
year of all consumer protection case resolutions by the CFPB, FTC and state attorneys general 
underscores this point. The only situations in which public enforcers did not universally obtain 
injunctive relief was a tiny set of cases brought by state attorneys general who relied almost 
exclusively on outside counsel to prosecute the actions, resulting in large sums of money 
returned to the government, but which obtained injunctive relief in only 25% of cases.263 That 
public compensation is almost invariably accompanied by prospective relief illustrates the sharp 
distinction between compensation to people as a part of the deterrence remedies of public 
enforcement and private suits focused primarily on obtaining compensation.  
 
  3. Public Compensation as a Discretionary Money Remedy 
 
 
256 F.T.C. v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 654 F.3d 359, 373 (2d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). 
257 Garry A. Gabison, Public Enforcement of Private Rights, 18 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 207, 215–16 (2017). 
258 Id. at 217-218. 
259 Exceptions are mostly fedl csr credit laws that allow for statutory damages…even then, Spokeo Article III injury 
concerns 
260 NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES (10th ed. 2020), § 12.2.1, 
updated at www.nclc.org/library. 
261 Id. at § 11.4.2.1.1.  
262 CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY (2015) 
263 Cox, et al., supra note 5 at 90. 
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The discretion typically afforded public enforcement agencies in exercising executive power 
over money remedies further supports the doctrine of public compensation developed by courts.  
Enforcers can obtain civil penalties or public compensation, or both. The amount of these 
awards, however, are sometimes in tension, as an award of public compensation often will 
decrease the amount of money that can be obtained as a civil penalty. This substitution of one 
form of money relief for another again shows why the “uniquely favorable” terms of the public 
compensation doctrine are explained by the unique structure and rationales of public 
enforcement. 
 
The factors used in determining the amount of civil penalties substantially overlap with the bases 
for determining public compensation. Factors used by courts to determine civil penalty amounts 
in FTC cases, which also have been used in state attorneys general enforcement actions, include   
injury to the public and whether the penalty eliminates the violator’s benefits from the 
violation.264 One of the two primary factors employed by the SEC in deciding the amount of a 
civil penalty is depriving the violator of unjust gain, and the SEC also considers the need to deter 
and the degree of injury to innocent people.265 Because civil penalties and public compensation 
have substantial overlap in purpose, they can be substitutes, at least in a one-way direction for 
most enforcers. If an enforcer decides to forego possible public compensation, the enforcer has a 
basis for seeking more in civil penalties.266  
 
This substitution between money remedies becomes express in the enforcement authority of the 
SEC and CFPB. Civil penalty money usually is directed to the government treasury, while public 
compensation obviously is paid to people affected by the violation.267 With SEC Fair Funds, civil 
penalties can be converted into public compensation in the same enforcement action.268 Congress 
authorized the CFPB to use civil penalties in a way that muddies even more this distinction 
between civil penalties and public compensation. With its Civil Penalty Fund (CPF), the CFPB 
can use money collected as civil penalties to pay public compensation in future cases where the 
Bureau is unable to collect the amount of a public compensation award, typically because of the 
defendant’s insolvency.269  
 
 
264 United States v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 662 F.2d 955, 967 (3d Cir.1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 908, 102 S.Ct. 
1253, 71 L.Ed.2d 446 (1982); State v. Mandatory Poster Agency, Inc., 199 Wash. App. 506, 526, 398 P.3d 1271, 
1281 (2017) (citing Reader’s Digest); State by Humphrey v. Alpine Air Prod., Inc., 490 N.W.2d 888, 897 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1992), aff'd, 500 N.W.2d 788 (Minn. 1993). 
265 Press Release, Statement of the Securities and Exchange Comm’n Concerning Financial Penalties (Apr. 2006)( 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-4.htm) (“corporate penalties are an essential part of an aggressive and 
comprehensive program to enforce the federal securities laws, and that the availability of a corporate penalty, as one 
of a range of remedies, contributes to the Commission’s ability to achieve an appropriate level of deterrence through 
its decision in a particular case.”). 
266 This is especially true because settlements overwhelm fully litigated cases as a share of public enforcement cases, 
meaning enforcers must have agreed to the specific allocation between civil penalties and public compensation 
rather than the result occurring by a court order. 
267 Civil Penalty Fund, CONSUMER PROT. FIN. BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/payments-
harmed-consumers/civil-penalty-fund/. 
268 Supra Part II.C.4.   
269 Craig Cowie, Putting Money Back Into Consumers’ Pockets: An Empirical Study of the CFPB’s Civil Penalty 
Fund (2020), __ U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3537984. 
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Substitution of money remedies again distinguishes public enforcement from private actions. In 
cases without some form of statutory penalty, private actions have no similar substitution of 
money remedies. Even when statutory penalties are present, the penalties add money relief to the 
private litigants in addition to private compensation, as any such additional relief is paid to the 
same private litigant, whereas civil penalties are paid to some form of government fund, except 
with SEC Fair Funds. 
 
A recent CFPB enforcement action brought during the Trump Administration demonstrates is 
illustrative. In CFPB v. Omni Military Loans the Bureau sued the lender for violating the 
Military Lending Act in collecting installment loans made to military service members. In 
settling the case, the CFPB obtained a civil penalty of over $2 million, but no public 
compensation for the service members even though the Military Lending Act treats loans made 
in violation of the statute as void ab initio. Although from 2012 to 2016 the CFPB obtained 
nearly 12 billion dollars in restitution for consumers, by 2020 the agency shifted to follow the 
highly restricted view of when the agency is entitled to restitution seen in Central District of 
California’s CashCall post-trial order.270 Under the settlement, Omni thus was able to continue 
collecting void loans from service members who received no public compensation at all from the 
enforcement action. But ironically, the money Omni paid in civil penalties went into the 
Bureau’s CPF to be held for the benefit of future victims in other cases.271 
 
By imposing upon itself a higher burden for seeking public compensation, the CFBP created a 
result that shows why the uniquely favorable public compensation doctrine traditionally used by 
courts produces remedial results consistent with the purposes of public enforcement. For the 
CFPB, its drift away from awarding public compensation has caused an ironic glut in its CPF.272 
The shift led the Bureau to begin hoarding money penalties collected in its enforcement actions 
in the fund established by Congress to provide redress to victims of insolvent defendants, 
because the agency would not allow itself to distribute these funds under its narrow view of its 
statutory mandate to compensate consumers affected by violations of the law. 
 
For civil enforcement agencies across a range of market protection regimes, tighter requirements 
for public compensation would simply provide an incentive to enforcers to forego public 
compensation in favor of higher penalties deposited into the public treasury or another fund. 
Money obtained from either form of relief rests on a desire to deter future violations and the duty 
to implement the law. There is no policy reason to prefer civil penalties over public 
compensation; in fact, Congress has made express a preference for money obtained in 
 
270 MAJORITY STAFF OF THE COMM. ON FIN. SERVS., 116TH CONG., SETTLING FOR NOTHING: HOW KRANINGER’S 
CFPB LEAVES CONSUMERS HIGH AND DRY (2019). 
271 Press Release, CFPB, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Settles with Omni Financial of Nevada, Inc. for 




272 See Kate Berry, What Will Incoming CFPB Chief do with $570 Million Consumer Aid Fund?, AM. BANKER (Jan. 
25, 2021); Dara Duguay, Let Non-Profits Tap Residual CFPB Penalty Funds: The Time to Put this Money to Use is 
Now, THE HILL (Feb. 12, 2021). 
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enforcement actions to be used for public compensation in creating Fair Funds and the CPF.273 
The uniquely favorable posture of enforcement agencies in seeking public compensation is in 
part justified by the discretion they are typically afforded in choosing between money penalties 
or public compensation. 
 
  4. The Absence of Class Procedure. 
  
Historically, civil law enforcement actions seeking public compensation have not been subject to 
the procedural restrictions of class actions. Despite this, a body of relatively recent scholarship 
argues that public compensation essentially constitutes public enforcers acting as class action 
counsel.274 Some authors compare the participatory deficiencies and conflicts of interest for 
enforcers in awards of public compensation to those found in class actions. While this view has 
little support in caselaw, the blurring between class actions and public compensation did leak 
into the Seventh Circuit’s Credit Bureau decision. In particular, the Seventh Circuit cites the 
Supreme Court’s decision Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes as support for its holding.275 
 
Chief Judge Wood wrote a lengthy dissent in Credit Bureau that is relevant to the broader 
scholarly debate about the role of public compensation cases in law enforcement. Unlike class 
actions, in a public civil enforcement action “there is only one plaintiff.”276 The FTC and other 
public enforcement agencies are authorized to obtain relief even when it would not be available 
to private litigants. Unlike class actions, public compensation is typically paid in one lump-sum 
with discretion afforded to the enforcer on how to distribute the money.277  And in contrast to 
Wal-Mart, public compensation to the FTC or other enforcers does not “present the problem of 
internal conflict within a class.”278 As Chief Judge Woods recognized, disgorgement as a form of 
public compensation is supported by the unique position of public enforcers as civil law 
enforcement, and find supports in the fact that “this understanding of disgorgement permeates 
the case law of our sister circuits” in SEC enforcement actions.279 The dissent repeatedly 
 
273 Conversely, money awarded for public compensation can end up in a government treasury. When an enforcer is 
unable to identify or locate recipients, or the costs of identifying recipients outweighs the benefit, courts have 
allowed the money to be directed to the government treasury, public accounts dedicated for particular purposes, or a 
nonprofit for educational or other public purposes. 
274 Adam S. Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 500 (2011) (public compensation “mimics” class 
actions); Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State Attorneys General, 
126 HARV. L. REV. 486, 493 (2012) (state attorneys general suits seeking public compensation are “public aggregate 
litigation” that “bears a striking resemblance to the much-maligned damages class action.”); Michael D. 
Sant'Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, The Agency Class Action, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1992 (2012) (describing 
public compensation as an “agency class action”); Winship, Fair Funds and the SEC's Compensation of Injured 
Investors, supra note 59, at 1108 (describing the SEC as “public class counsel” when obtaining public 
compensation); see also Elysa M. Dishman, Class Action Squared: Multistate Actions and Agency Dilemmas, 96 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 291, 295 (2020) (in state attorneys general multistate actions “the analogy to the class action 
compounds, and a second ‘class action’ of a sort emerges.”). 
275 Credit Bureau at 772. See infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text for discussion of Walmart’s restrictive views 
of Rule 23’s commonality requirement in class certification. 
276 Credit Bureau at 791-792 (Wood, J, dissenting). 
277 See, e.g., U.S. S.E.C. v. Quan, 817 F.3d 583, 594 (8th Cir. 2016) (“Indeed, disgorged funds are paid not to the 
SEC, but to the district court, which has discretion over how to disburse them.”).  
278 Credit Bureau at 791-792 (Wood, J, dissenting). 
279 Id. at 793 (Wood dissent). 
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criticizes the majority for relying on cases involving private litigants, observing that a line of 
cases concerns “implied private rights of action—a problem we surely do not have here.”280 
 
The scholarship equating private class actions and public compensation never grapples with the 
core problem that public compensation rests on different statutory authority based on different 
rationales unique to public enforcement.281 Class concerns are a nullity in public enforcement 
because class action prerequisites under civil procedure rules exist to overcome the 
impracticability of mass joinder of a numerous class of similarly situated plaintiffs with private 
claims. Because a public enforcer seeking public compensation, in the words of the Eight 
Circuit, “is not analogous to a private plaintiff suing for money it is owed” it is even less 
analogous to a group of private plaintiffs suing for money they are owed.282 The procedural 
problem of joinder is simply not relevant when a public enforcer exercises its discretion in 
deciding whether to implement law through seeking public compensation, or not.283 “A lawsuit 
by an organ of the government acting in the public interest to enforce specific statutory and 
regulatory provisions and prevent violators from keeping their ill-gotten gains” only bears a 
passing resemblance to a traditional lawsuit.284  
 
Or, as Chief Judge Woods said specifically of the FTC, “[t]he presence of the government as a 
litigant is especially important to the public-interest component of the analysis when the 
government seeks remedies.”285 This is because for the government, public compensation as a 
remedy lies “uniquely within its toolbox” and “is aimed squarely at undoing public harms and 
preventing future ones through deterrence.”286 The absence of class procedural prerequisites 
from the substantive doctrine of public compensation is not indicative of a substantive defect in 
that law. Rather it is a feature of the constitutional order which tasks executive power with 
implementing the rule of law. 
 
V. UNIFIED PUBLIC COMPENSATION LAW 
 
An alternative to a reversal in the judicial trend toward conflating the law of public 
compensation with the law governing private claims is legislative enactment of statutes that 
clarify and unify the authority of enforcers. In the Appendix, we propose model federal 
legislation to create uniform opportunities to seek public compensation across enforcers. State 
legislatures can adapt the language of this proposed legislation to accomplish the same goals at 
the state level. Subpart A makes the case for uniform authority. Subpart B examines the concepts 
underlying our proposed legislative reform.  
 
 
280 Id. at 789 (Wood dissent). 
281 See Sarah L. Swan, Plaintiff Cities, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1227, 1291 n.167 (2018) (describing how both Prentiss 
Cox and Howard Erichson reject the analogy between class actions and public compensation, and quoting Erichson 
as arguing that “the nature of the litigative representation differs significantly in the two types of cases.”). 
282 U.S. S.E.C. v. Quan, 817 F.3d 583, 594 (8th Cir. 2016). 
283 See SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1978) (“[T]he court is not awarding 
damages to which plaintiff is legally entitled but is exercising the chancellor's discretion to prevent unjust 
enrichment.”). 
284 Quan, 817 F.3d at 594. 
285 Id. at 793 (Wood dissent). 
286 Id. 
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 A. The Need for Uniform Authority 
 
Almost no two federal enforcers regularly obtaining public compensation have identical 
authority. The SEC has the right to obtain disgorgement, and has its statutory Fair Funds power 
to convert civil penalties into public compensation; a right that likely will be exercised more 
frequently in light of the invitation to litigate limits on disgorgement unleashed by Liu. The 
CFTC also protects investors, yet it has express statutory authority to use either type of public 
compensation measure, but not the power to substitute civil penalties for public compensation. 
The likely litigation surge testing the limits on implied equitable disgorgement authority will 
raise untested questions about the application of these limits to the CFTC’s express authority. 
The CFPB may face the same questions if it attempts to situate its public compensation requests 
squarely within its express disgorgement authority. And while the CFPB shares with the SEC a 
right to substitute civil penalties for public compensation, it operates with completely opposite 
restrictions; available only in other cases and not the action for which the penalties were 
collected. The FTC’s public compensation authority may be reshaped by the AMG decision, but 
regardless of that decision the FTC will retain public restitution authority and civil penalty 
authority hobbled by restrictions imposed on no other enforcer.287 Agencies less frequently 
obtaining public compensation, such as the FDA or HUD, rely on implied statutory equitable that 
will no doubt be challenged in light of the recent judicial movement to restrict public enforcer 
use of this remedy.  
 
Taking a step back to observe the broad sweep of public compensation across enforcers raises 
question of whether these disparities exist for a persuasive reason. Investors subject to loss due to 
insider trading can be made whole through civil penalties converted to disgorgement under SEC 
Fair Funds authority, while a decision against the FTC in AMG would mean homeowners subject 
to a foreclosure scam likely would receive no public compensation. Why are investors treated 
differently, in fact better, than consumers in these situations? Why does an agency with UDAP 
authority over consumer finance violations have broader public compensation authority than 
agencies with UDAP authority over other types of market place protections? Why do certain 
enforcers have the right to shift money awarded as civil penalties to public compensation, but not 
other enforcers?  
 
Tracing the history of all of these differences in authority is beyond the scope of this article, but 
it is readily apparent that the differences in the market protection rationales of the various 
enforcers do not justify the vast discrepancies in public compensation authority among them.288  
The variation in statutory authority for public compensation appears mostly to be the result of 
historical happenstance and the ad hoc, iterative development of the law through statutory 
authorization and case law.  
 
 
287 Cf Chopra & Levine, supra note 64, at 47 (proposing a suite of creative administrative reforms to facilitate 
expanded monetary relief in FTC enforcement actions under the Commission’s penalty offense authority instead of 
section 13(b)).  
288 See Beales & Muris, supra note 95, at 6 (development of FTC remedial provisions in the 1970s); Donna M. 
Nagy, The Statutory Authority for Court-Ordered Disgorgement in SEC Enforcement Actions, 71 SMU L. REV. 895, 
896 (2018) (history of SEC remedial authority). 
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These differences in statutory authority obscure the long-established judicial consensus that 
allows for the statement of a public compensation doctrine. The tendency of courts to cite to 
public compensation cases across enforcers, and the application of common causation 
presumptions and loosened proof requisites, show a decades-long judicial inclination to view 
public compensation as a common problem across market protection schemes. Given the broad 
similarities in purpose and function among market protection enforcers, the burden should be on 
those opposing authority for certain enforcers to justify why uniformity in public compensation 
should not be available to those affected by market protection law violations. 
 
The rapid reaction to Liu by Congress in creating new statutory authority for the SEC is 
consistent with a Congressional consensus to support the liberal award of public compensation. 
Congress has steadily expanded enforcers’ statutory authority for public compensation over the 
last few decades. It recognized public compensation in amendments over the years to the 
remedial statutes of the SEC and FTC.289 Congress created SEC Fair Funds authority in the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 and expanded CFTC public compensation authority in the DFA in 
2010.290 When it created the CFPB, Congress gave the new agency remedial authority expressly 
incorporating a right to both forms of public compensation and the authority to convert civil 
penalties into public compensation through the civil penalty fund.291 Absent from this history of 
evolving public compensation statutory authority is any Congressional action to retrench public 
compensation powers previously granted. Similarly, two state legislatures, Arizona and Iowa, 
reacted to state supreme courts rejection of state attorney general power to obtain disgorgement 
through a statutory injunctive provision by amending state law to expressly provide that 
authority.292 
 
The urgency of this model legislation project is heightened by the recent retreat from public 
enforcement rationales in cases determining public compensation. As we described earlier, 
federal courts have sharply restricted access to the courts for private claims. A constriction of 
public compensation brings us closer to a consequence-free violation of market protection laws, 
or at least a judicial system that has neutered its own authority to provide any recompense to 
people affected by those violations. 
 
 B. Concepts Supporting Model Legislation 
 
The proposed legislation would eliminate these senseless disparities. Congress can strengthen 
public enforcement, thus deterring violations of market protection schemes, while also building 
law that is clearer for courts and enforcers to apply, improving both efficiency and fairness of 
civil law enforcement. In this subpart, we identify three key concepts shaping the proposed 
legislation. 
 
  1. Clarify Alternative Availability of Both Forms of Public Compensation.  
 
289 Id. 
290 See supra Part II.C.4. 
291 See supra notes 267-269. 
292 State ex rel. Horne v. AutoZone, Inc., 275 P.3d 1278, 1283 (Ariz. 2012) (distinguishes the validity of 
disgorgement FTC authority because it is in a separate section of the statute); State ex rel. Miller v. Santa Rosa Sales 
& Mktg., Inc., 475 N.W.2d 210, 219 (Iowa 1991). Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-1528 (amended to add parallel express 
disgorgement authority); 1992 Iowa Legis. Serv. 1062 (West) (S.F. 2276). 




Disgorgement currently is largely based on ancillary equitable authority, or at least a general 
statutory incorporation of that equitable authority, while public restitution almost always is based 
on express authority. This difference creates difficult interpretative questions for the courts. In 
Liu, those issues arose as an existential question of whether disgorgement is authorized by a 
statutory injunction, and resulted in holdings contravening the use of disgorgement as employed 
by some courts. In AMG, the issue is whether disgorgement is authorized based on the specific 
language in the statutory injunction provision when that statute also authorizes public restitution. 
All of these issues would be avoided by making express the implied. Enforcers should be able to 
seek, and courts should be able to award, either form of public compensation as dictated by the 
circumstances of the enforcement action. 
 
Our proposed model law replicates most of the language in the CFTC express authority 
contained in the DFA.293 This language authorizes the CFTC to use either disgorgement or 
public restitution in seeking public compensation. The restrictions on calculating disgorgement 
awards imposed in Liu may shift the relative benefits of using public restitution rather than 
disgorgement for enforcers with access to both forms of public compensation. And as we have 
shown in above examples, public restitution can be a better measure of the harm caused by 
certain violations. In Figgie, the seminal FTC public restitution case, this gap was quite 
substantial. The court determined that disgorged profits amounted to about $7.5 million, while 
possible consumer loss exceeded $49.9 million.294 Allowing enforcers the discretion to choose 
between seeking either measure based on the circumstances of each case would allow courts to 
consider awarding public compensation under the measure the harm caused by the violation. 
This comports with the public policy goal of having businesses internalize the social costs of law 
violation in weighing the potential costs to themselves, which is the essence of public 
compensation as deterrence. 
   
  2. Preserve What Works  
 
The proposed legislation replicates the judicial consensus embodied in the public compensation 
doctrine. It expressly incorporates the reasonable approximation framework for determining the 
proper amount to award in public compensation. Courts are familiar with applying this 
framework and the abundant case law provides a grounding for the meaning of this text. The 
legislation incorporates the proposed proportionality test for difficult public restitution cases—an 
area in which courts have articulated a need for guidance.  
 
The legislation addresses the changes and uncertainties in the law created by the Court’s decision 
in Liu. The legislation includes a clear divide between measuring disgorgement by gain and 
public restitution by loss. The authority to award either disgorgement or public restitution 
preserves the flexibility to adapt public compensation to the circumstances of each case, but 
settles an area of discord in the case law, consistent with the holding of Liu. The legislation also 
would clarify, consistent with past judicial practice, that expenses incurred in creating a violation 
 
293 We omit the reference to “proximate cause” for public restitution, which led the Eleventh Circuit to impose 
common law tort proof standards. Supra note 82. 
294 FTC v. Figgie Intern, Inc., 994 F.2d 595, 605 (9th Cir. 1993). 
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are not deductible from a public compensation award, and joint and several liability can be 
imposed when a person knew or should have known about the violation.  
 
The proposed legislation would make clear that enforcers have the authority to reallocate public 
compensation money they are unable to distribute into a fund that would operate as does the 
CFPB civil penalty fund, permitting fulfilment of public compensation awards in other cases 
involving insolvent defendants. The empirical scholarship validates the effectiveness of this type 
of funds.295 When such distributions are impractical, this provision of the proposed legislation 
would allow for depositing the funds in the Treasury, removing any possible restrictions imposed 
on SEC use of residual public compensation funds in Liu.296  
 
Finally, the legislation makes explicit that public compensation is solely for public enforcement, 
which is consistent with the decades of case developing a doctrine uniquely available to public 
enforcers. A provision clarifies that the new law does not allow for a private right of action to 
force an agency to seek public compensation or a private right of action to force allocation of 
public compensation to any person.  
 
  3. Decouple Public Compensation from Equity.  
 
Perhaps most importantly, a legislative enactment would save public enforcers, courts and 
business defendants countless millions in litigation costs to resolve arcane questions of equity 
jurisprudence. The issues raised, but left mostly unresolved, in Liu concern how to measure a 
disgorgement award, and on whom to impose a disgorgement obligation, so that it does not 
constitute a penalty and thus contravene the traditional limits of equity. By incorporating vague 
references to “disgorgement” in creating express authority for the CFTC and CFPB, and by 
adopting an express SEC right to obtain disgorgement as “unjust enrichment,” Congress left 
unresolved questions about whether these statutes alter the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
traditional equity limits on disgorgement. The expenditure of time and creativity by attorneys 
and courts to resolve these questions would be neither necessary nor useful in the context of 
public enforcement.  
 
The model legislation directly addresses and resolves this problem. It commands use of an 
equity-like “broad and flexible construction… in favor of deterrence of violations… and the 
practical implementation of the remedial goal of compensating people.” It expressly states that 
“public compensation is not subject to the traditional limits imposed on judicial authority in 
equity.” The proposed legislation also addresses the issues of joint liability, calculation of net 
profit without expense deduction, and use of residual public compensation funds. In other words, 
the proposed legislation would make judicial determination to award disgorgement a question 
 
295 Cowie, supra note 269. Although the proposed legislation does not include the use of substitution of civil 
penalties into public compensation for all enforcers, a good case can be made for doing so. The justifications for 
SEC Fair Funds authority and CFPB civil penalty fund authority would seem to have equal force in other market 
protection enforcement sectors. 
296 The proposed legislation include a savings clause for existing public compensation authority to make clear that it 
is designed to provide supplemental statutory authority available to use in enforcement of the identified market 
protection laws. The law is designed to bring a minimum level of authority to all public enforcers, not abrogate 
existing tools that have proven effective. 
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resolved by statutory interpretation without reference to the perplexing cross-currents of 
traditional equity.  
 
Decoupling disgorgement from traditional equity makes sense because the limits of traditional 
equity derive from the law governing private claims that has little meaning in the context of 
public enforcement. Why should courts be concerned about stepping over the line into 
punishment in a public enforcement action? The alternative money remedy in public 
enforcement is for the enforcer to seek an actual civil penalty. And in the case of the SEC and 
CFPB, to then repurpose that money to public compensation, either in the same case (SEC Fair 
Funds) or in other cases (CFPB Civil Penalty Fund). It makes no sense to debate the fine points 
of ancient principles of equity—or in the case of Justice Thomas’s dissent in Liu, the question of 
whether the principles as applied to disgorgement are sufficiently ancient—when Congress or 
state legislatures can resolve the question of the proper function of public compensation as a 




Though often an opaque and muddled area of law, public compensation has been an effective 
civil law enforcement tool for more than seventy-years. It has delivered billions of dollars in 
relief to millions of investors, consumers, workers and others, and strengthened deterrence 
against law violations. In this article, we have distilled a doctrine that reflects the consensus 
position of courts. Public compensation is awarded under broad and flexible standards that are 
alien to judicial resolution of private claims. This occurs because public compensation is a 
remedy guided by the rationales of public enforcement and the unique position afforded public 
agencies under the U. S. Constitutions and federal statutes, and similar authority given to state 
attorneys general and state agencies under state laws. We have extended the doctrine to suggest 
the use of a multi-factor test when courts encounter difficult public restitution cases for which 
there is less case law guidance. 
After decades of effective use, the law of public compensation has been unsettled by recent 
judicial decisions. This disruption comes at a time when access to class actions has been 
restricted, often leaving public compensation as the only option for people to recover money lost 
to companies violating market protection laws.   
Congress and state legislatures can resolve this disruption by enacting laws that would clarify 
public compensation law. Our proposed law would create uniform authority across public 
enforcers, and would allow the use of either disgorgement or public restitution as appropriate to 
the circumstances of the enforcement action. Market protection laws achieve their purpose in 
direct relation to the effectiveness of their enforcement.  
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Appendix: Model Federal Legislation 
 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in 
Congress assembled,  
 
SECTION 1. Short title. 
This Act may be cited as the “Civil Public Compensation Act”. 
 
SEC. 2. Findings. 
Congress finds that— 
(1) civil law enforcement agencies of the United States have obtained court orders directing 
compensation to victims of unlawful acts for more than seventy-years years; 
(2) recently some courts have questioned the authority of agencies to obtain compensation for 
victims of unlawful activity in civil law enforcement actions; and 
(3) the rule of law requires that civil law enforcement agencies of the United States must deter 
unlawful activity and provide public compensation to victims.  
 
SEC. 3. Remedial authority of administrative agencies. 
Chapter 161 of Title 28, U.S. Code is amended by adding at the end the following:  
 
“§ 2417. Public compensation in civil law enforcement actions of the United States 
 
“(a) Authority to Award Public Compensation.— 
 “(1) Wherever a court of the United States has jurisdiction to hear a civil action brought 
by or on behalf of an agency, board, bureau, commission, or department of the United 
States to enforce a civil market protection law, the court may order a person found to have 
violated such law to pay public compensation to persons in connection with the unlawful 
act.  
 “(2) In awarding public compensation, courts shall afford a broad and flexible 
construction of this section in favor of deterrence of violations of the civil market 
protection law and the practical implementation of the remedial goal of compensating 
people affected by violations of civil market protection law, and public compensation is 
not subject to the traditional limits imposed on judicial authority in equity. 
 
“(b) Definitions.—As used in this section:  
 “(1) Public Compensation.—Means disgorgement or public restitution awarded against 
a person who violates a civil market protection law. 
 “(2) Disgorgement.—Means an order of compensation measured by the gains received 
in connection with a person’s unlawful act without offset for the person’s expenses incurred 
as part of the violation of a civil market protection law. 
 “(3) Public Restitution.—Means an order of compensation measured by the victims’ 
losses suffered in connection with a person’s violation of a civil market protection law.  
 “(4) Civil Market Protection Law.—Means a law of the United States promoting 
fairness, transparency, or efficiency of interstate commerce including but not limited to 
laws promoting: consumer, investor, or worker protection; and food, drug, cosmetic, and 
transportation safety;  but not civil law enforcement of antitrust laws.  




“(c) Reasonable Approximation; Rebuttable Presumption.— 
 “(1) A prima facie determination of public compensation may be established by a 
reasonable approximation of the disgorgement or restitution owed. 
 “(2) Upon a prima facia showing of disgorgement or restitution owed, the person found 
to have violated a civil market protection law may rebut the approximation of public 
compensation with specific, admissible evidence demonstrating that the approximation is 
manifestly unreasonable. 
 “(3) Where the subject of a civil law enforcement action has rebutted the reasonable 
approximation of public restitution owed, the court may determine public restitution owed 
through a balancing test including the following factors: — 
  “(A) the value, difficulty and cost of determining harm and distributing 
compensation to individual victims; 
  “(B) the usefulness and cost of a claims process or similar mechanism to 
identify loss amount; 
  “(C) the likelihood of victims recovering loss through a past, pending, or future 
private action; and 
  “(D) the egregiousness of the subject’s illegal activity.   
 
“(d) Double Recovery Prohibited.—Based on the government’s reasonable approximation, 
a court may award either disgorgement, restitution, or in appropriate circumstances, both. 
However, a person may not receive a double recovery through public compensation after 
considering past recovery from return of money in connection with the violation or 
payments received as a result of a private action. 
 
“(e) Joint and Several Liability.—Where two or more persons are found liable for violation 
of a civil market protection, a court may in the interest of justice hold one or more of the 
subjects jointly and severally liable for public compensation if the subject knew or should 
have known the act violated a civil market protection law of the United States. 
 
“(f) Distribution and Preservation of Public Compensation; Establishment of Victim Relief 
Funds.— 
 “(1) Where a court orders public compensation in a civil law enforcement action, the 
prevailing agency, board, bureau, commission, or department of the United States shall 
exercise reasonable efforts to distribute compensation to victims of the unlawful act. 
 “(2) An agency, board, bureau, commission, or department of the United States eligible 
to obtain public compensation for victims of unlawful acts under this section may establish 
by rule a victims public compensation fund to be maintained at a Federal reserve bank in 
accordance with such requirements as the Board of Governors may impose and:— 
  “(A) Where the court finds that the government is unable after reasonable 
efforts to direct collected public compensation to the victims of an illegal act, the court 
shall order such remaining compensation deposited into the agency, board, bureau, 
commission, or department’s victim public compensation fund; and 
  “(B) Amounts in a victim compensation fund shall be available to that agency, 
board, bureau, commission, or department without fiscal year limitation, for court ordered 
payments to uncompensated victims of unlawful activity in other past or future civil law 
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enforcement actions. To the extent that such victims cannot be located, or such payments 
are otherwise not practicable, the agency, board, bureau, commission, or department may 
direct such funds to be returned to the United States Treasury. 
 
“(g) Relation to Other Laws.—No provision of this section shall be construed as modifying, 
limiting, or superseding the operation of any other law that affords greater, different, or 
more specific relief where the government prevails in a civil law enforcement action.  
 
“(h) No Private Right of Action. Nothing in this section shall be construed as authorizing 
a private right of action to require a government entity to seek public compensation or to 
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